After the talks: Putin stalls for time, Europe waits for Trump, Ukraine holds the front
The main outcome of the talks is that Putin has bought time. At the same time, it seems that the further strategy of all parties will remain unchanged.
1. Everything that has happened in recent weeks has been a one-man show. Putin was doing everything in his power not to cause an explosion of anger Trump. The Europeans were "backing" Trump into a corner so that he would finally explode. Some Republicans also seem to have supported the Europeans.
But Trump did not explode.
And so the second act of this one-man play begins.
2. What will this act be like? Putin will once again play the game of "Ukraine and the EU disrupting the negotiations". In parallel, through Dmitriev, Russia will continue to make tempting economic proposals (conspiracy theories aside, it seems that these proposals, which provide for billions in earnings today, are the main brake on Trump's "explosion").
3. The Europeans seem to be continuing their previous tactics of trapping Trump. Let me remind you once again that all of Dmitriev's proposals are impossible without the EU's approval. And Europe will not consider any concessions for Russia until the issue of US tariffs, security issues (NATO in Europe), and the Ukrainian issue are resolved.
The only difference between the second act and the first in the European strategy is the potential desire of the Vatican to play a more significant game. Consequently, contacts in the United States may intensify along these lines.
4. Lindsey Graham's law, which seems to have a chance to run as a track parallel to the White House mainstream, has two significant problems. Adoption of this law without prior agreements in the Middle East would mean a halt to negotiations with China and a quarrel with India, which are the main buyers of Russian oil. Therefore, it is worth watching how the US-India, US-Saudi Arabia, US-UAE, and US-Israel negotiations will (or will not) go (especially in the context of the nuclear deal with Iran). But even if everything goes according to the most positive scenario for us, the minimum time lag for the implementation of this law is the end of 2025.
But at the same time, we need to look at Trump's ratings and their correlation with attitudes toward Russia and Putin. Deteriorating ratings will force the White House to be more decisive.
5. I would also like to focus on the "sensational" Bloomberg news that Putin is "sick of the summer offensive" and believes that he will be able to make breakthroughs this summer, although military analysts do not understand what this optimism is based on.
I've been saying this for a couple of months now, but Western analysts are overlooking three more good reasons why he wants the war to continue:
a) Putin's regime relies on a proactive minority (up to a third of the population) that wants Ukraine's complete destruction. Stopping the war could lead to a large part of these people joining the real opposition. The Kremlin does not yet understand what to do with this;
b) The Kremlin's domestic political bloc is just beginning to form a system in which veterans returning from the front will be controlled not only by the FSB and the Interior Ministry, but also by the veterans themselves. In the fall, a single voting day will be held to test the idea that every tenth deputy will be a veteran. Then this system will have to be "tested and refined." Kiriyenko and C o are unlikely to say that they are ready for people to return before the beginning of spring 2026. And this is just one aspect of preparations for the return to peace;
c) the largest nationalization and re-privatization campaign in history (after 1917) has been launched in Russia. The main beneficiaries are six (Chemezov, Kiriyenko, Kovalchuk, Rotenberg, Sechin, Patrushev), with about ten more families in the second tier of this whole story. Stopping the war means at least slowing down nationalization. And I'm sure that these people from Putin's inner circle are doing everything they can to ensure that the war has no chance of stopping.
As for the outlook, I continue to believe that the next negotiating window of opportunity will open no earlier than the end of 2025. At the same time, I do not rule out that China may be involved in the negotiations as part of the US-EU-China triangle.