After Yermak: The president is weighing not only candidates for the head of the Presidential Office, but also the architecture of governance

For over a week now, Ukraine (or rather, the domestic state and political system) has been living without Yermak, who, according to many commentators, was almost a defining element of the power system in our country, influencing almost everything.

So what? It's all right.

The country is alive and working. Negotiations with the Americans are taking place. As it turned out, this is possible even without Yermak. And even the President's Office is working, although Yermak's successor has not yet been appointed. Neither a managerial nor a political catastrophe has occurred. And it was not supposed to.

Many are beginning to realize that Yermak's real political influence was greatly exaggerated. On the other hand, it is also obvious that after he left, no political miracle happened. The country remains in roughly the same state, with the same problems as before (except, perhaps, for the problem of Yermak himself).

And it is no coincidence that a discussion has already begun about the fact that although he is no longer in a high position, he allegedly remains (either behind the scenes or figuratively, as a kind of "collective Yermak"). This discussion has either a purely conspiratorial dimension or a journalistic and theoretical significance. Therefore, for now, I will refrain from participating in the debate about the "shadow of Yermak" in the Ukrainian government.

It is better and more useful to pay attention to the specific events that characterize political life now.

The main event, which has not yet happened, is that there is no new head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. Judging by Volodymyr Zelenskyy's statements, he has already met with all potential candidates for this position. Some have even gone for a second round of such consultations. The decision was expected on December 5, but it did not happen.

The president seems to be very hesitant. He is not just choosing between personalities. It is also a choice of the next model for administering his policies.

It is quite likely that Zelenskyy would like to have the same versatile administrator, assistant, and negotiator that Yermak tried to be, but without his toxicity and conflict. However, any potential candidate for the position of head of the President's Office will be different, both in terms of their personal and political qualities, and in terms of their perception within Ukraine, as well as by our international partners.

Yermak also failed to do almost everything. And it is unlikely that potential candidates for the role of chief administrator in President Zelenskyy's team aspire to this. And it won't work out, even if someone wants to. The domestic political situation is changing significantly, and international circumstances are becoming more complex. The main thing is that no one wants a new Yermak.

If a professional military officer is chosen for the position of Head of the President's Office, it emphasizes the function of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief; if a professional diplomat is chosen, it emphasizes negotiations and foreign policy functions. But now there is a growing need to resolve internal political problems and challenges. Who will be in charge of this?

Therefore, President Zelenskyy will have to rely not on one person, but on a group of his closest associates, each of whom will be responsible for a separate strategically important area.

In fact, it might make sense for the President of Ukraine to create something like a "kitchen cabinet" (a conditional "politburo") for making the most important decisions that would allow maintaining a balance of political interests regarding various challenges – military, negotiating, security, domestic political, and socio-economic. But is Volodymyr Zelenskyy ready for this?

Another reason why there is still no decision on a new head of the Office of the President of Ukraine is that not every potential candidate for this position is eager to get it. Rather, the opposite is true. The position of head of the Office is perceived (after Yermak) as a toxic place that can destroy one's future political career. And some do not want to lose their "feudal domain," where they are king, god, and military chief.

Interestingly, almost all of my informed interlocutors, with whom I have recently discussed the topic of personnel appointments (not only for the position of head of the President's Office), said almost in unison that when the president personally asks to accept his proposal, it is almost impossible to refuse. But then, either the president does not ask persistently enough, or he does not ask yet, but only inquires, or the potential candidate finds very weighty arguments why he cannot be moved from his current position to another.

But what is the positive aspect of the current situation, when there is no new head of the President's Office?

First, Volodymyr Zelenskyy is getting used to living and working without Yermak. He is forced to adapt to a new reality and, to some extent, rebuild management and political mechanisms. The main button on his control panel no longer works, and a new one has not yet appeared. And most likely, a new and more complex "control panel" will be needed.

But even more importantly, the management system and the political environment are quickly getting used to living without Yermak. It is not yet entirely clear what will happen next and how, but the processes of restructuring political relations have already begun.

In this context, the events that took place on December 3rd were significant.

The first event was the adoption of the state budget for 2026. It happened in a rather mundane way, without much fuss, unexpectedly quickly, and without any particular problems. I am not evaluating the budget itself. There are many, even a great many, questions and comments about it. But, from the perspective of the defining trends of political life without Yermak, the very fact of its adoption by parliament is significant.

This is always one of the key votes in parliament. In many democracies, this vote is equivalent to a vote of confidence in the government. In early December, it seemed, and well-known parliamentary insiders talked a lot about it, that there were no votes for the budget, that the "Servant of the People" faction was on the verge of collapse and losing its status as a parliamentary majority.

But something else happened. The budget was approved by 257 deputies, including 193 deputies from the "Servant of the People" faction. This means that both the situational majority, which has been used to pass most parliamentary decisions since the autumn of 2021, and the absolute majority of deputies from the presidential faction demonstrated their loyalty.

The core of the "Servant of the People" faction, which is usually loyal to the president, consists of 170-175 deputies. For more than 190 "Servant" deputies to vote, additional mobilization of votes within the faction is needed, which is always difficult. For the budget, the "Servant" votes were gathered almost to the maximum.

This vote showed that the leadership of the parliament and the leadership of the pro-presidential faction maintain control over the parliament, as well as over the absolute majority of deputies of the presidential party, and ensure the adoption of necessary decisions.

Significantly, this happened in the absence of President Zelenskyy from Ukraine and without the intervention of the President's Office. The key role in this was played by the Speaker of Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, and, especially, the head of the "Servant of the People" parliamentary faction, David Arakhamia.

David Arakhamia has confirmed his reputation as a very effective negotiator within parliament. By adopting the 2026 budget, Stefanchuk and Arakhamia effectively sent a signal of their loyalty to President Zelenskyy, but also showed that they can ensure control over parliament without interference from the President's Office.

But this will not happen automatically. Accordingly, they (and the faction as a whole) must be reckoned with and negotiated with.

However, the Verkhovna Rada still has quite strong inter-party disagreements (the opposition still wants a coalition government), and the situation within the "Servant of the People" faction remains difficult. We will see how stable the situation in parliament will be in the future when the Verkhovna Rada votes on the appointment of several new ministers.

Another significant event took place on December 3. The Kyiv Court of Appeal released NABU detective Ruslan Magamedrasulov from the pre-trial detention center, where he had been held for five months. I find it hard to believe in such a sudden display of judicial justice.

This is either a backroom deal between the "security forces" (when the Yermak factor is absent), or a gesture of reconciliation from the SBU and the prosecutor's office towards the NABU (as if to say, Yermak is gone, let's stop the "war" in which we were used).

But I would also like to point out that the NABU detectives' cases are not definitively closed. In other words, it's about a readiness for a "truce," not a complete abandonment of the confrontation that arose a few months ago. As I understand it, not all the problems between the "security forces" have been resolved yet. And the problems were not only about Yermak's influence.

In any case, a new political life is just beginning. Many interesting events and new political trends lie ahead.

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