What happens if Putin dies?

"May he die," the President of Ukraine said Volodymyr Zelenskyy shared a common Christmas wish with Ukrainians in his address. Sometimes Christmas wishes come true. If this happens, how can events develop further? Will the elites bite the bullet and see Russia collapse? And what will happen to the war?To understand this, we spoke with ten analysts from Ukraine, Europe, and Russia. (Spoiler alert: the scenarios are different, but they are united by the issue of war – it will change, but it will not end.)Here is the direct speech of the interlocutors LIGA.net.Valeriy Pekar: There will be Putin 2.0Lecturer at Kyiv Mohyla Business School Valeriy Pekar:"When Putin dies, Putin 2.0 will take his place.Russia's policy is shaped by objective factors: if the empire does not take over Ukraine now, it will collapse or be swallowed by China.Therefore, the new dictator's policy will be the same as the previous one.But the new one will need some time to consolidate power, and during this time, the probability of collapse is higher."Ogryzko: No Putin, no RussiaMinister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007-2009), Head of the Center for Russian Studies Volodymyr Ohryzko:"The head of the Russian State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, said: "There is Putin, there is Russia. No Putin, no Russia". Maybe someone thinks it's a joke, but without Putin, there is no Putin's regime. Therefore, an objective process of disintegration of Russia will begin.Ukraine will have to ensure that without Putin, Russia will not be a constant threat to Ukraine. Russia's disintegration can be based on a regional principle – the subjects of the Russian Federation will realize that they can live without Moscow without control.We cannot rule out that the FSB will try to put someone of its own on the throne.But if you look at how the Putin regime defended itself during Prigozhin's rebellion, the entire security structure will fall apart in the same way, and will think not about defending anyone but about saving themselves.Different towers of the Kremlin will start fighting for power. Putin's regime may remain transitional for some time, with elements of the old and the new.The United States and China will probably seek to preserve Russia within its borders, but some leaders in the West wanted to preserve the USSR, which did not save it. You can want to, you can be afraid, but objective factors will work regardless. Therefore, the West should now prepare in advance so as not to make mistakes later.This is Ukraine's task – to explain to its Western partners that it will be much more beneficial for them to have a peaceful post-Russian territory free of nuclear weapons and imperial nostalgia for their own security than a new post-Putin, nuclear, aggressive and savage Russia."Novikov: The struggle inside the Serpent of Gorynych will beginRussian and Ukrainian lawyer and advocate Ilya Novikov:"Currently, the Russian regime is holding on to two factors: huge cash infusions and brutal violence. However, there are systemic points of tension:The North Caucasus, where the situation can "flare up" if there is a lack of money or resources for violence;The Far East, which is economically more heavily weighted toward China and Japan than Moscow. In the long run, in 20 years, this region may actually cease to be Russian;Kaliningrad region, whose connection to the center is extremely unstable due to its dependence on transit through the Baltic states.Putin's death alone will not solve all the problems – there are about 20 million people in Russia who actively support the war: the military, their families, and those who make money from it. A generation of children of the dead occupiers is growing up who will be brought up with the idea of revenge, which creates the basis for a new conflict in 10-20 years."Good Russians" from democratic emigration who are afraid to make statements about the return of Crimea in order not to lose the votes of the future electorate are ineffective.It is better to rely on the "bad Russians" – regional elites and even criminal organizations that have vested interests and conflicts with Moscow. Supporting regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of Russia into dozens of small states, which is the only real chance to avoid a new major war.In the event of the dictator's death, a fierce power struggle will begin in Russia. Putin deliberately did not leave a legitimate successor, seeing him as a threat.Formally, Prime Minister Mishustin may gain power. He is only a technical bureaucrat who may try to make concessions to the West and Ukraine to preserve his own position. The structure of the FSB itself is not a monolithic force, but resembles the Dragonslayer, where each head cares only about his own enrichment, which weakens the overall state strategy."Ponomarev: Business is for Mishustin, Sechin and Patrushev are the frontRussian oppositionist, chairman of the "Congress of People's Deputies" Ilya Ponomarev:"There is a phrase that everything can change in Russia in one year, and nothing in 100 years.If Putin dies, everything will change, but in the long run, everything will go back to where it started. After all, Putin had an unusual rise to power, and all his actions were not like anything we have seen before in Russia. But the result is exactly what Russia has always had.After Putin's death, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin will become head of state. This is what the Constitution says.There will be a moment of turbulence in the first few hours – theoretically, to prevent Mishustin from becoming president, the security forces must physically remove him before his succession is announced and make the person they want acting prime minister.Then, within three months, elections are to be held. The key struggle will be in the first week. Then it will become clear whether it will be the prime minister or some new coalition. After the elites agree on who it will be, the competition will begin to swear allegiance and reach an agreement with the new president.If the elites agree that it will be Mishustin, two large resistance groups will form. The first is associated with Sechin, the second with the group formed around Patrushev.It will be difficult for these resistance groups to reach an agreement. But without an agreement, they will not win and will simply become a front. Mishustin will be supported by all major financial groups, all businesses, and many government officials. For them, he is a return to normalcy. There are far fewer risks of major upheavals associated with Mishustin than with the notional Patrushev Jr.I would not expect a revolt by regional elites. The vast majority of regions now have purely technical leaders who have no political experience and no political ambitions. There are only a few regions that could theoretically start something – Chechnya, Yakutia and Tatarstan. They may still have a desire to redistribute something.But if Mishustin comes to power, he will be able to negotiate very calmly and pragmatically, without riots. Because he is a manager, a technocrat, and we will be talking about agreements about money, not politics.I am 100% sure that Mishustin does not want to continue the war. This does not mean that he will surrender and return Crimea. The deal proposed by Trump is the perfect solution for him to just end it all. Although Russia's attitude toward Ukraine will not change, they will declare the continuation of Putin's course. The active phase of the war will simply end."Hara: The FSB has the best chanceDiplomat, expert at the Center for Defense Strategies Oleksandr Khara:"When the Fuhrer of the 'Russian World' passes away, a power struggle will begin among his inner circle.The FSB faction and the security forces have the best chances. They control command positions, money, media, and the armed forces. They will look for a balance between several people or put their own candidate.The military is subordinate to Putin personally – they will not hand over the nuclear case to the speaker of the State Duma or anyone else. In the early days, the nuclear button will be controlled by the first person to reach it. The best chances are with the people from the Ozero corporate group.They do not have a figure to play the role of a king. Either there will be someone more nimble in the environment, ready to drown competitors in blood, or a bloody struggle will begin. It can lead to centrifugal tendencies in the regions. The poor state of the economy deepens conflicts there, and if the center is weakened, some regions may try to gain independence.A conflict can begin immediately after the death of a dictator and, after a while, escalate into a major armed confrontation.First, this is a Russian tradition of ruthless and meaningless rebellion. Secondly, Putin has destroyed the political field for 25 years. It is impossible to solve problems there in a civilized way. Therefore, the only way to resolve the issue of power is with weapons and violence. There will be no fair elections in Russia, and the anti-Putin opposition has no chance of winning them.Russia can crumble, it's only a matter of time. The United States and China will try to help it. At one time, George W. Bush spoke in the Ukrainian parliament and urged the deputies not to go down the path of independence because he wanted to save the Union from collapse. But things went wrong. The current administration in the United States has a soft spot for dictators. Trump likes tyrants who conquer other countries. Therefore, he may come to the aid of Putin's successor to keep Russia in check and pull it away from China.The Chinese will try to prevent the collapse of Russia because it is important for confrontation with the West. But along with the economic problems, the collapse of the Russian under-empire is approaching.Putin's death could quickly change the course of the war in Ukraine's favor. A window of opportunity for success on the battlefield may open up when the central government is paralyzed by internal struggles. They will have no front.America can put pressure for a pause and bargaining, so that Ukraine does not regain as much as possible and humiliate Moscow. Even during the Yevgeny Prigozhin rebellion, the United States asked Kyiv to refrain from taking active steps. This time, it would be wrong and counterproductive to heed this advice."Fesenko: Putin does not have his own Beria. There will be a hangoverVolodymyr Fesenko, political scientist, director of the Penta Center for Political Studies:"When Putin dies, the situation in Russia will change, but not immediately. In the first weeks, a transitional transition from Putin's regime of almost autocratic power will begin.Formally, the current prime minister will perform the duties of the president. If Mishustin remains, he will be. He will not have the same influence as Putin. So, rather, it will be a collective governance regime.Who will be part of this collective is a question. There is no institutional basis for collective power now. Most likely, it will be led by people who have influence over the security forces-from the FSB to the army-and who have media resources and friends in the government-the Kovalchuks, Rotenbergs, and Sechin. Mishustin will coordinate this transition period as the official successor. Vizh will be the No. 1 candidate and the legitimate center of power.There is also the question of which of the security forces will be the most influential.Now, rather than Putin's death, we should expect the replacement of the head of the FSB. People in Russia's security forces – Bortnikov, Patrushev, and Gerasimov – may pass away before Putin. Although there are no really influential security officials among them – Putin does not have his own Beria.Therefore, the process of power struggle can last from several months to several years. It can take on more conflictual forms. Especially if the security forces intervene in this struggleThe role of the FSB in this struggle in the first weeks will largely depend on who will lead it. The FSB under Putin has become one of the main elements of the Russian Deepstate, which will be active. If the FSB, as a collective institution, supports Mishustin, he will have a significant advantage.A change in leadership can accelerate peace negotiations. The new leader may represent a more constructive approach to ending the war. If it is a collective leadership, they can take collective responsibility for the decision to reach a more or less compromise agreement.The conditions for ending the war will differ little from what Putin is proposing. They will make demands and put pressure on Ukraine. There will be no return to the 1991 borders or withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories. There will be tough enough negotiations, but the probability of ending the war will be much higher.An escalation option that is possible if Putin's successor is a member of the security forces. A person from the military or the FSB, focused on war and confrontation with the West. Such a president could gain additional legitimacy from escalation and the war with Ukraine would continue.There will be no rebellions in the regions. The likelihood of Russia's disintegration after Putin's death is much lower than it was in the mid-90s. Now the vast majority of regional elites, including in the problematic republics, are Varangians.I do not think that Putin's death will immediately create a power vacuum in Russia. The degree of control of the government and the management of state institutions in Russia is an order of magnitude higher than in Ukraine. There are no processes of any kind of sovereigntization there. The level of centralization has increased.In general, after Putin there will be a very hard breakdown. For Russia, it is supposedly an organic state when it has a popular dictator. But after he disappears, the withdrawal will be severe. Like a hangover, Russia will be staggering, taking chaotic steps. The country is unlikely to normalize. Unfortunately, Putin is a very deep and very large-scale disease. Russia will not be able to recover from it on its own."Skorkin: There will be a casino with blackjack and princesKonstantin Skorkin is a political observer and author at the Carnegie Berlin Center: "In my opinion, any leader who replaces Putin will go for de-escalation in order to preserve the foundations of the regime and the wealth of its beneficiaries. The closest historical associations are Khrushchev after Stalin – preserving the Soviet totalitarian system through partial internal liberalization and dialogue with the West.In such a system, "public opinion" should not be taken into account. The majority of society will silently swallow peace, just as it did war. For the active militarists, there is the FSB, but they are already being purged.Much will depend on the personality of the heir apparent – according to the Constitution, the acting prime minister is the prime minister, currently Mishustin. He is a neutral technocrat who can be a transitional figure while the elite clans sort out their relations.There is also a decorative position, but in the event of a crisis, it could become important: the position of Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, held by Dmitry Medvedev, who is formally a vice president.I wouldn't discount Medvedev, no matter how ridiculous and comical his figure may look. Khrushchev was also considered a jester in Stalin's circle.In fact, in the event of Putin's sudden death, the issue of his successor will be decided by a conditional "Politburo" – representatives of the highest bureaucracy (Vaino, Kiriyenko, Gromova), siloviki (Patrushev, Bortnikov, Zolotov), state oligarchs (Sechin, Miller, Chemezov), and big business in the court (Yuri Kovalchuk, the Rotenberg brothers, Timchenko).Everyone in this "casino" will have their own bet and their own favorite. It can be anyone.There are the so-called "princes" – the sons of Politburo members (the most popular is Dmitry Patrushev). There is the favorite of the liberal part of the bureaucracy, such as Moscow Mayor Sobyanin or the newly minted "Westerner" Kirill Dmitriev. Then there is Kozak, who is being portrayed as a "dissident in the Kremlin."The security forces will use the power resource as an argument, control over the situation, and an opportunity to prevent problems in the North Caucasus. Kiriyenko, for example, will rely on an extensive network of his proteges among the bureaucracy. Gromova will rely on her control over the media and so on.In terms of war and peace, the regime will remain hostile to Ukraine and the West. However, it will revert from offensive tactics to Putin's policy of zero – more bribery, economic infiltration, sabotage and diversion than direct military action. For the new government, the main thing will be the lifting of sanctions and the return of access to foreign assets, so it will agree to end the fighting and make certain concessions.If Putin were gone, Trump's current peace plan would satisfy his successor. Another thing is that the West will not trust such "dyed foxes" as those of the noughties, and it will not work as before, but who in Moscow draws conclusions from their own experience.This is a scenario of a stable transit of power – I assess the regime's position as relatively stable, albeit in a state of permanent turbulence.But Russia is an ultra-centralized state, so any crisis scenario in the capital can provoke centrifugal processes and chaos in governance. As for national autonomies, I know that in Ukraine there is a certain sentiment for liberation movements, but they are currently nothing more than a bunch of activists without mass support, national enclaves firmly ruled by ethno-nomenclature clans are now one of the pillars of the regime.But herein lies the fragility of the system: the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation will depend on how these clans, especially the most powerful Kadyrov clan in Chechnya, behave during the crisis. By the way, disintegration can occur not only along national borders; for example, there is the Far East, which is integrated into the Pacific economic system and perceives dependence on Moscow as a feudal tribute.I don't really believe in open wars between different groups of security forces – rather, the change of power will be accompanied by a series of "suicides" and "accidents" among generals, and possibly "Ukrainian terrorist attacks" that will make it clear which "party" has won.A more realistic consequence of the chaos at the top is the possibility of massive ethnic clashes in major cities between locals and numerous migrants from Central Asia. This tension is currently being eased only by the war, but it could become an impetus for civil strife."Muzhdabaev: Security forces will be paralyzedMedia manager, deputy director of the Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR Ayder Muzhdabaev:"Modern Russia will collapse in the same way as the Soviet Union did in 1991 – at some point, people will simply not go to work, and security forces will go home.The FSB will not fight for control, but will wait for "new masters." They will be ready to obey even the Ukrainian government if it becomes a new force.When Putin dies, there will be no armed confrontation between the FSB, the Rosgvardia, and the army. These structures are part of the "ordinary mafia" that is used to obeying force, and without tough leadership, they will simply be paralyzed, as was the case during the Prigozhin rebellion.The destruction will occur through the separation of national regions. The Caucasus and Bashkortostan may be the first to fall out of control, followed by Buryatia, Yakutia, and Tatarstan.The Kremlin will retain control of the nuclear button until it is completely demolished. Massive popular protests are not expected, but localized elite revolts are possible, which will occur faster than any popular unrest.Civil war is only possible within national regions, as there will be no nationwide resistance or defense of the old regime – no one defended the USSR in 1991, and no one will defend the current system.This situation can be compared to a huge mechanism that rests on one rusty part: as soon as it breaks, all the other gears don't start fighting each other, they just stop and wait for someone new to come and start the machine again or disassemble it for scrap."Freudenstein: It will be 1917 in reverseRoland Freudenstein, security expert and co-founder of the Brussels Freedom Hub think tank:"Putin's death is not inevitable in the near future, but when it happens, it will open up a whole range of possibilities. The regime could become even worse, even more aggressive externally and even more repressive internally. It could also mean immediate attempts to reform both Russia's foreign and domestic policies. I actually believe that whoever comes after Putin:will not have the legitimacy of a "ruler in office" that Putin has been accumulating for 25 years;will have strong incentives to do things differently, as Russia will be in a much worse state than it is now, especially economically and in terms of social cohesion.The third possibility is continuity, which, admittedly, is the most likely outcome, at least for a while. Therefore, my guess is that we will see option #3 before option #2.In a way, 1917 was the opposite. Then, before the totalitarian revolution, there was a bourgeois revolution. Now it can be the other way around.There is definitely a risk that tensions within the "apparatus" will explode. In addition to various political players, I see the merger of organized crime with the government as another source of possible violence. But I do not rule out an orderly transfer of power to a new ruler or collective leadership.I don't see any prospects for the separation of Siberia or the Far East. They can become drivers of change, yes. But the only entities that may well declare independence are in the Caucasus. Most of the regions of Russia today have an ethnic Russian majority – for example, in Buryatia it is 70%.I assume that whoever comes after Putin will handle the "red button" responsibly.The new leadership will seize the opportunity to end the war, showing a greater willingness to compromise than Putin. But perhaps I am too optimistic..On the one hand, they may be afraid of being accused of betraying their "homeland." On the other hand, they will know how unpopular the war will be. My gut feeling is that Putin's death will be a great opportunity for many to "come out of the shadows" and say: "I ALWAYS knew the war was a mistake!"Giles: Everyone will keep the system stableKeir Giles is an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, who has been researching Russian strategy, military doctrine and security policy since 2013, having worked at BBC Monitoring and the UK Defense Academy:"I assume that Putin will take measures to ensure that the transition of power is as orderly as possible. He will want to guarantee protection for his family and the wealth he has accumulated over decades in power.Putin is not the only one interested in stability. All the key players in the Russian system depend on its stable operation to maintain their power, wealth, and avoid prison. They need to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control during any upheaval or power struggle.There is little reason to believe in the idea of Russia's "fragmentation" during any period of instability. It is tempting to think of it as a mirror image of the end of the USSR in 1991. But many of the factors that broke up the Soviet Union are not present within Russia. Some will even work in the opposite direction.There are no nationalist movements. Many of the Russian Federation's constituent entities, which could have an independent identity, are completely dependent on the center for subsidies that keep their economies running and enrich their leaders.We should not expect serious changes in Russia just because Putin is no longer on the throne.The only question for the war against Ukraine and Europe is whether any new leadership figure will be able to take a more informed view of the damage the war is doing to Russia itself. And whether they can see the advantage of a different balance between Russia's dream of reclaiming its empire and the long-term systemic damage it does to the country's future.For this text, we spoke with experts: Vladimir Fomichev, Milan Golovan, Mariam Ohannisyan, Ihor Tymoc, Yulia Abibok, Sergiy Berezhnyi, Yevhenia Mazur.Read alsoWhen a drone goes silent, factories can shut down. How much the defense industry will collapse after the "hot phase" of the war