Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations

The thought of this article came to me more and more often at the end of 2023, when my team and I tried to sum up the stormy year of 2023, and most importantly, try to form our strategy for the upcoming year of 2024.

It was a tough year. We still didn't understand why it was getting harder and harder every day, despite being in a completely different position compared to 2022. Something was wrong. Something had to be seen and foreseen in the future. Something that could change everything, or at least somehow keep things in a situation where anything was still possible.

War in 2023 has changed dramatically. And while its physical nature was completely clear to us, which allowed us to even influence its further development, for example, with a comprehensive approach to UAVs and space reconnaissance, it did not yet seem possible to form a full-fledged strategy for our future behavior.

The dependence and use of economic opportunities and their increasing involvement in the war process as a whole became even more obvious.

Finally, we also realized that it is impossible to constantly be dependent on weapons supplies from Western partners. And not even because sooner or later they will run out of such weapons, but primarily because the weapons themselves will change over time and our partners will no longer have them. Something fundamental was missing in the approach to building a quality strategy.

Finally, after the consequences of the decisions made in the field of mobilization began to cause their disproportionate damage, everything fell into place.

Academic lessons immediately came to mind. Because according to Clausewitz, speaking of war as a continuation of politics by other means, it is implied that strategy cannot have a rational basis until the goals that need to be achieved are clearly defined.

Political goal of the war

The political goal of the war is what answers all questions. And if, according to the same Clausewitz, war is a "trinity": the population, the armed forces, and the state administration, then these aspects are three different codes of law, and among these parties, it is the population that is the most sensitive party in terms of supporting war.

Without public support, it is impossible to wage war successfully. Then perhaps the main form of such public support is society's attitude, first of all, to mobilization, which quickly began to fail.

Clausewitz also emphasized: in order to have the support of the population, it is important that the public is well informed, able to distinguish "right" from "wrong", "one's own" from "others". Naturally, the support of the population is strongest and most tangible for "their own" and "the right", that is, national – in practice, it becomes unconditional when they are directly exposed to danger. A danger can be any threat that is perceived as a direct threat to the independence of a state.

So, it is obvious that no matter how much the military command tries to form a military strategy for a certain period, all this will not bring any results without political will, which is precisely formed through a political goal.

Returning to Clausewitz, the basis of his theory is that wars are usually fought for political, not military, goals, and are driven not so much by physical, but primarily by ideological forces.

One evening, I gave the order to pull up all the directive documents that were coming to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in order to find out what the political goal of the war was. Or, perhaps, we missed something. Because only with the formation of a political goal all subjects of the state will try to reach the outlined line on the horizon. Which can then claim victory. Unfortunately, then we did not miss anything…

It is this term that ultimately makes it possible to see not only what the enemy is doing, but also how to move forward ourselves. It was then that I tried to formulate a political goal for our war, to outline the necessary strategy for achieving it.

Then I prepared a long article that remained on the top shelf of my desk. It was called "On the political purpose of the war for Ukraine at the end of 2023."

One of Carl von Clausewitz's most important postulates is true. It is that war is subject to change, and these changes occur in accordance with changes in politics. And indeed, it should be so. Because the changes that occur in the war also require changes on the political and economic fronts.

But the degree of political tension at that time did not allow my conscience to give this article a boost. The internal political situation was already too fragile. But some of its provisions nevertheless formed the basis for the plan of our actions for 2024. Which, unfortunately, remained on paper. Later, another team developed its idea and brought it to life.

Today, as of the end of 2025, the war in Ukraine has been going on for twelfth year. And with absolute certainty, we can say that it is increasingly bearing the hallmarks of a global war. Yes, in terms of the number of its victims, it has not yet reached the global scale, but in terms of the level of global impact and consequences, it is about ready to start its dangerous account.

Confirmation of this, for example, can be an episode from our history, when supposedly strong personalities of the modern world claimed about possible quick solutions and the long-awaited peace.

A peace that has not yet come.

Number one target for Russia

This confirms that Ukraine is in an extremely difficult situation, where a quick peace will definitely only lead to a devastating defeat and loss of independence. However, as time has shown, it was not possible to achieve it.

Now it is interesting isn't this a consequence of Russia's appetites, which may extend beyond Ukraine. Obviously, it is. All, again, due to a misunderstanding of Russia's political goal and the lack of its own political vision, which was presumably based on the possible political goals of global players. But even then, even if such an understanding comes, following the same theory of wars, any delay in war is to the detriment of the one who is attacking. The Russians cannot allow this – then the expected peace in Ukraine without building a new security architecture, at least in Eastern Europe, is simply impossible.

Here, for Europeans, I can’t resist quoting Benjamin Franklin: "Those who give up freedom for temporary security deserve neither freedom nor security." This is how the United States is shaping its policy in Europe today.

At a time when Western politicians were captive to their own illusions, drawing pink scenarios or playing along with each other, thinking about the reconstruction of Ukraine, and their experts, in unison with their Ukrainian colleagues, were drawing the future elections in Ukraine, the line of combat contact was confidently moving towards Dnipro, and today – towards Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. Not many people pay attention to this anymore. Sometimes it seems that even at the front, like a hundred years ago, they are no longer waiting for victory, but for the long-awaited peace. However, the Russian classic of the theory of military art, Svechin, did not think so a hundred years ago. There is something more complicated behind this.

His own story is also interesting. As a tsarist general and hoping to be useful to the communist regime, in 1927 he published the book "Strategy", in which he outlined his view of the system of preparing for and waging war by the state. His story can be instructive in our difficult times. Alexander Svechin was arrested and shot in 1938 by the same communists he decided to serve. But now it's not about him, but about the strategy itself and its connection with politics, first of all.

So, trying to find a definition of the political goal of war, we find a rather interesting definition in the aforementioned author: "Any struggle for one's own interests can only be waged consciously and systematically if its goals are understood."

This is the first step towards understanding the essence of Russia's actions. The entire subsequent description of events, of course, confirms that, using, first of all, the weakness of the collective West and international institutions, the Russian leadership has formed a goal that is quite understandable not only for the military leadership, and does not concern the resolving of individual territorial claims or the protection of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. Russia is not interested in the Donetsk or Luhansk regions, except for their mobilization potential. Thousands of "svechinists" have already joined the ranks of fighters for "the Russian peace" and joined him.

Russia's number one target is Ukraine. It is Ukraine, with its subjectivity and independence and all its potential, that should become the gateway to Europe. Is that why it is so difficult today to find an understanding about stopping the war. Of course, following the same author's logic, such goals are not publicly announced, or are fundamentally distorted and announced publicly in order to attract as many supporters as possible.

Therefore, historians will be able to find out in what form the deprivation of Ukraine's sovereignty and the restoration of imperial ambitions were intended when it becomes possible. But the nature of events since the fall of 2021, throughout 2022 and to this day, especially the spread of distrust towards the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the revealed corruption ties of individual members of the National Security and Defense Council, as well as the rhetoric and behavior of the Russian leadership, leave no doubt about Russia's goal: Ukraine must cease to exist as an independent state.

This conclusion is something we, Ukrainians, must remember. Understanding of this conclusion should form the basis for building our own strategy for preserving the state. This strategy should be built on a political goal, which will be determined by the state's top military-political leadership.

A logical question arises: what exactly is a political goal. And why is a military strategy, which already affects the economy, not enough?

Everything, again, lies in the foundations of the science of war. And it says: "The task of the high military command is to destroy the enemy's fighting forces. The purpose of war is to win a peace that meets the conditions of the policy supported by the state."

So war is not a goal in itself, waged only by the military, but is waged in order to conclude peace under certain favorable conditions.

A politician, when determining the political goal of war, must take into account positions on the military, social, and economic fronts of the struggle, the capture of which will create favorable conditions for peace negotiations. So, obviously, not only defense on all these fronts is important, but targeted attacks on each such segment of the enemy must bring success, especially in a war of attrition. This needs to be remembered.

Thus, in determining the political goal of the war, it is actually necessary to define the tasks and unite the leadership on the fronts of political, economic, and armed struggle.

Preparations for the invasion

What was Russia doing?

Already having a clearly defined goal of the war, taking into account its own capabilities and the state of our country, under the slogans of ending the war that began in 2014, grossly violating international law, Russia, presumably from mid-2019, is beginning unprecedented preparations for an invasion in Ukraine, deploying troops along our borders and beginning their training.

Strategy is the art of combining preparation for war and conducting operations to achieve its goal. Strategy solves issues related to the use of both the armed forces and all the resources of the country to achieve the ultimate goal. This, by the way, is the first stone that Ukraine's defense is breaking. The strategy must use all the necessary resources. However, can it fully own them?

According to the same Svechin's logic, there are only two types of strategy to achieve this political goal: defeat and/or exhaustion. Humanity has not come up with anything else.

It would seem, why do we need to remember a Russian theorist who has long been forgotten in Ukraine? It is in the context of these two strategies that it is possible to consider the course of our war and, most importantly, to find the only correct strategy for our actions, built on a correctly defined political goal.

So the Russian leadership, which set a political goal for military action, was clearly aware of what was possible for the strategy with the available means and how their policy could influence the change of the situation for better or worse. Presumably, everything was foreseen.

In August 2021, when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia's war against Ukraine had been going on for seven years. Although the Armed Forces of Ukraine were undergoing transformation and gaining combat experience, they still had a large number of problems in various areas. The Russian army was rapidly increasing its forces and supplies. The analytical resource Global Firepower Index published a rating in the fall of 2021, according to which the Russian Armed Forces ranked second among the strongest armies in the world after the United States, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine ranked 25th.

Russia increased its military budget year after year, invested resources in the defense-industrial complex, and purchased more and more weapons and equipment. They significantly outnumbered us both in numbers and equipment. Starting in 2019 and for the next three years, Russia's military spending only increased. At the same time, in Ukraine, everything happened the other way around – in 2021, the army was allocated even less money than in the previous year. And although politicians loudly declared that more than 5% of GDP was allocated to the security and defense sector, this is not only about the Armed Forces, it is also about the National Police, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Guard, and border guards.

Of the 260 billion hryvnias, less than half was for the Ministry of Defense. Funding for the development and procurement of weapons and equipment was not increased; the bulk of the money traditionally went to providing financial support for the military. Because of this, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were in a state of stagnation – there was a lack of finances for development and increasing combat readiness, there was a problem of personnel outflow and understaffing of military units.

The budget of 2022 was adopted by parliament in the conditions of an escalation of the situation and the build-up of Russian troops near the Ukrainian borders. As a result, it grew by only 10% and reached 133 billion hryvnias.

But this is nothing compared to the challenges that awaited Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in connection with Russia's full-scale aggression. The future will show that the persistent underfunding of the army has led to the accumulation of a whole series of problems.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine met the full-scale Russian invasion with a huge shortage of everything from people to weapons.

As of the end of 2021, the Russian army was 5 times larger than the Ukrainian one, with 4 times more tanks and armored combat vehicles, 3.4 times more artillery, and 4.5 times more attack helicopters. The situation in the Ukrainian Navy was even sadder – we had no aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or submarines.

As of August 2021, the Armed Forces of Ukraine numbered 250,000 people, of which about 204,000 were military personnel. The size of the Russian army increased from year to year and by that time already amounted to over a million military personnel.

There were only 24 combat brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the time of my appointment. It's about combined-arms brigades of the Ground Forces, Air Assault Forces, and Marines, which are the basis of the groups for conducting ground operations. From their number, as of August 2021, 12 brigades were already performing combat missions in the East and South of Ukraine. So we had only 12 combat brigades left, which were at training grounds, at permanent deployment points, and which could be sent to fight the enemy during a full-scale aggression.

All this gave Russia every opportunity to use the strategy of defeat to achieve its established political goal. Therefore, in 2021, Russia began to significantly increase the number of troops along the border with Ukraine. And already by August, the configuration of possible invasion directions was emerging. According to intelligence estimates, the existing number of Russian troops near the Ukrainian borders allowed the enemy to create up to six operational groups of troops that could be involved in the invasion. In addition, troops were also accumulating in temporarily occupied Crimea for an offensive in the Tavria and Azov directions.

In general, before the invasion, the Russian offensive group was estimated to consist of at least 102 battalion tactical groups – up to 135 thousand servicemen, 48 operational-tactical missile systems, up to 2 thousand tanks, 5319 armored vehicles, 2 thousand artillery systems, and up to 700 units of MLRS.

Russia had an absolute advantage in the number of air attack and air defense weapons; before the war, it updated its aviation combat equipment and re-equipped it with more modern technology. Intelligence estimates suggest that the enemy could deploy up to 342 operational-tactical aircraft and 187 helicopters for the invasion. In addition, the Russians have created naval groups to conduct operations in the Black and Azov Seas.

This is what the situation looked like at the end of 2021. We were significantly inferior to the enemy in the number of weapons and military equipment, ammunition, and personnel. We, unlike the Russians, had very little modern weapons. At the beginning of 2022, the General Staff conducted calculations that showed that the total need for funds to repel aggression, including for the restoration and replenishment of missile and ammunition stocks, was estimated at hundreds of billions of hryvnias. Which the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not have. It is difficult to say what political goal this state of the most important institution in the country served.

Therefore, the Russian strategy of defeat envisaged clear and definitive military actions that had enough potential to achieve the political goal both by a quick strike on the capital and by strikes in other directions, but in a limited time. At the same time, such potential was only enough to carry out such actions if they were to be successful. A characteristic feature of such a strategy, in addition to the high, but limited allocated potential, is the enemy's lack of strategic reserves, which are not intended to be created and used in the strategy of defeat.

Operational reserves, typical for the military, are part of the groups and remain an allocated potential. Thus, the achievement of the political goal was carried out mainly by military methods, of course, in combination with classic informational and psychological campaigns and actions, and, presumably, special actions aimed at agents and the fifth column were carried out, which were supposed to precede military actions.

However, the situation turned out differently.

Changing the strategy of defeat to a strategy of attrition

Ukraine, which found itself under attack from an enemy that is several times larger in size, economy, population, military budget, and army size, has survived. First of all, thanks to the heroism of Ukrainians, innovations, and parity achieved with the help of allies.

Of course, such a reaction of ours should be part of a political goal. Because it was the unprecedented heroism of the citizens of Ukraine that became the key to victory and should be the result of a stable position on the political front.

Preventing an opponent from implementing their strategy to achieve a political goal is an absolute victory. A victory that, although costs Ukraine the lives of its best citizens and part of its territory, preserved the state and gave it, most importantly, a chance to fight and make peace on its own terms. A chance that we use to this day.

However, from that moment it is necessary to turn to military science. And it once again reminds us that to achieve the same political goal, when the calculation on the strategy of defeat does not come true, the strategy changes to attrition.

As will later become clear, this in no way refutes the determination of the ultimate goals. The whole world, not just us, has already been convinced of this today.

Since April 17, 2022, while the agents and the 5th column in Ukraine were preparing the ground for a new strategy, Russian troops focused their efforts on conducting military operations in the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions, where they were supposed to create conditions for preparing to carry out tasks within the framework of the attrition strategy.

From a military point of view, everything seemed clear. Russian troops, using the remnants of their saved potential, tried not to lose the initiative by delivering increasingly concentrated strikes, and in some areas, for example on the right bank of the Dnipro and in the South, went on the defensive, creating conditions for a protracted war. Wars of attrition. By the end of 2022, such actions continued almost along the entire front line, without significant operational successes, except for the liberation of the Kharkiv region and the right-bank Ukraine.

These actions were mainly the result of our use of the remaining operational stocks and stocks that were received dosed from partners, as well as Russia's partial use of its own limited strategic stocks. The result was our loss of most of the Luhansk region, and the left-bank part of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Objectively, the strategy of defeat has exhausted itself due to the lack of forces and means, as well as strategic reserves on both sides. This, by the way, is another reason for the emergence of positionality in the war. When there are insufficient material reserves and insufficient preparation on both sides, such a war is likely to become a positional one. However, later, under the force of other factors, this is what happened.

Presumably, examining these two theories, it is necessary to conclude that the strategy of attrition, according to military theory, can be used to create the conditions for defeat. Therefore, since the fall of 2022, Ukraine has been trying to create conditions for implementing the strategy of defeat in the following year, 2023.

However, due to the lack of a political goal, preparation continues only in the military direction and covers only strategic deployment and building capacity to solve tasks in 2023. Our reserves are limited by Western aid, the economy does not meet the needs of the front, society is focused on a quick victory in 2023 and is full of inflated expectations and hopes.

It doesn't seem surprising now that Russia's efforts in 2023 to focus on creating a powerful defense, which on the one hand was logical, supposedly serving to repel our probable offensive, and on the other hand, distracted our attention from the main thing, from forming the necessary material reserve for waging a war of attrition. While we were preparing for coffee in Crimea, the end of the war in 2023, and were watching the attempt to capture Bakhmut, Russia was putting the economy on military rails, launching propaganda and changing legislation, building strategic reserves, and dragging us into a war for which, just like in 2022, we were not ready. A war of attrition.

It was in September 2022, when the first drones flew into the territory of Ukraine, and Russian-influenced groups launched a discrediting campaign against the military leadership of Ukraine, that a new era of wars in the history of mankind began. Wars of attrition. By the end of 2023, this strategy was completely honed and perfected. The events of 2024, and especially 2025, despite minor achievements at the front, indicate the absolute effectiveness of such a strategy for Russia in its efforts to achieve its political goal.

What is this strategy of attrition? The definitions given by theorists of military art are very complex. And to understand it, historical analogies are needed. Because the tools and forms of implementation have changed, but the essence has not changed.

"A weak... enemy can be defeated by destroying its armed forces. But the line of least resistance to victory may pass through a certain prolongation of the war, which may lead to the political disintegration of the enemy. A strong and significant state can hardly be overthrown by methods of defeat without exhaustion," so say military classics.

They also add: "A war of attrition is waged mainly at the expense of reserves accumulated in peacetime; foreign orders for urgent replenishment before war can be extremely appropriate. A great power can organize a struggle for attrition solely on the labor of its industry during the war itself. The military industry can develop exclusively at the expense of military orders."

"Preparations for a war of attrition should focus primarily on the general, proportionate development and improvement of the state's economy, because a weak economy, of course, cannot withstand the severe tests of attrition."

It is almost impossible to understand these quotes, dated 1927, without drawing an analogy with these days. But it is absolutely true. The too expensive and devastating war must end quickly. This is the main postulate of NATO doctrine: there is no point in fighting a long war, because you have resources and opportunities to inflict more damage.

However, the history of our war confirms that the difficult path of the strategy of attrition, which leads to the expenditure of much greater resources than a short crushing blow, is usually chosen only when the war cannot be ended in one way.

The main thing to remember is that attrition strategy operations are not so much direct stages of achieving the ultimate military goal as stages of deploying material advantage, which will ultimately deprive the enemy of the prerequisites for successful resistance.

That's the answer to the question of how much it would cost to shoot down the 9000 air targets that Ukraine receives every month. This is precisely the implementation of the strategy of attrition.

However, a war of attrition is also being waged on the political front. Where, as I have already said, the main thing is the people of Ukraine and their ability to resist, through mobilization. And therefore, the path to political disintegration is becoming increasingly obvious.

The decisive blow that Russia may be preparing

As for military actions in a strategy of attrition. Military actions still play an important role in achieving political goals, but are not the main and final phase.

Presumably, the ultimate goals of military operations are not formed in advance, but are the result of situations created on the front, mainly through our actions. This means that with the achievement of, for example, the complete occupation of Donetsk or another region and the fulfillment of the task of some operation, the war will continue on both the political and economic fronts and, accordingly, will not achieve the political goal.

Or imagine the entry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the borders in 1991. Will this mean the end of the war? It is certain that this will change the configuration of the front line, which will run along the state border. However, will this end the war when both the economy and the population of Russia are ready to continue it?

And vice versa – with a healthy economy and the right domestic and foreign policies, it is possible to change the configuration of the front, of course, affecting the economy and population of Russia. Therefore, the goal of military actions in the strategy of attrition is not to carry out balanced and coordinated operations aimed at achieving a final goal, but to create conditions under which it is possible to deliver a decisive blow aimed at the collapse of the country on the economic and political fronts simultaneously.

Simply put, the enemy is trying to create social tension, losses in manpower, and excessive expenditure of financial resources by conducting military operations today. Fighting for symbolic geographical and cultural objects, rather than for tracts of land, is most advantageous in such a case. Turning such objects into fortresses only confirms and supports the enemy's strategy.

Perhaps the last thing to add about the strategy of attrition. Indeed, within the framework of the strategy of attrition, all operations are characterized primarily by having a limited purpose. War is not a decisive blow, but a struggle for positions on the military, political, and economic fronts from which, ultimately, this blow could be delivered.

Yes, the strategy of attrition has its own decisive blow. And if the overall strategy of attrition for the enemy is to bring the country to disintegration through military action, political and economic situation, then what is a decisive blow in this situation? If we look back at history, the answer is obvious.

It is a civil war. Yes, this is exactly the decisive blow that Russia systematically achieves by implementing a strategy of attrition.

This war, by the way, in the absence of a unified vision of security at least on the European continent, is possible not only as a result of achieving the political goal, which is implemented by the strategy of attrition, but also, oddly enough, through a "just peace", which, without security guarantees and real financial programs, will certainly lead the war with Russia to the next stage – a civil war.

Therefore, it is precisely the future threats and risks that indicate that defining a clear political goal is not only a task for the activities of the armed forces, but also a directive for political preparation the war, which broadly covers issues of economics, domestic and foreign policy. The assessment of the prospects of war should form a single goal that will unite the military, political, and economic fronts.

For example, if we consider the main stages of the development of the military-political and military-strategic situation around Ukraine, we can consider the following options for the political goal:

1. The period from February 2015 to February 2022. The stage of avoiding and preventing war. The political goal of this period should be: avoiding war by preparing armed forces, population, and economy, and taking foreign policy measures to limit Russia's military capabilities.

Among the main practical measures would have been preparing the country for war in all areas. The final practical phase could have been the introduction of martial law and the early deployment of armed forces in threatening areas.

2. The period from February 24, 2022 to December 2023. The stage of using the destruction strategy. The political goal could be: ensuring sustainable peace and preventing the war from spreading to the rest of Ukraine. If that is not possible, prepare for a war of attrition.

3. The period from February 2024 to January 2025. Strategic defense and alliance formation for active action in a strategy of attrition to seek a just peace.

4. The period from January 2025 to August 2025. Strategic defense with the task of preventing Russia from using its military achievements in shaping peace negotiations.

5. From August 2025. Preservation of the state through the maintenance of military, political and economic fronts. Formation of alliances and coalitions around depriving Russia of war capabilities.

What could be the end of the war?

It is a very strange situation when the issue of the end of the war, under the pressure of the next informational pretext, becomes a topic for the another forecasters in Ukraine.

Informational reasons alone are clearly not enough to form an expiration date of the end of the war. The end or cessation of a war, especially a war of attrition, will depend on the totality of achievements or, conversely, losses on the military, economic, and political fronts. Of course, a collapse on one of them can only cause the emergence of prerequisites for its end. However, the stability of the entire structure is completely dependent on the stability and potential of others. For example, so fast predicted peace in Ukraine will raise quite tough questions in Russia about the number of human losses suffered – it will be as difficult to explain as it is to explain corruption in Ukraine today. And it is natural that the situation on the political front in Russia will not allow this without significant concessions or complete defeat on our part. Today it is difficult to say whether the mediators who are trying to draw up scenarios for Ukraine understand this. But the fact that conditions do not get better for Ukraine every time is obvious.

When forming the political goal of war, it is important to remember that war does not always end with the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. This was the case of World War II, but it is a rare exception, because it has almost never happened in human history. The vast majority of wars end with mutual defeat, or with everyone being sure that they have won, or other options.

So, when we talk about victory, we must honestly say this: victory is the collapse of the Russian Empire, and defeat is the complete occupation of Ukraine due to its collapse. Everything else is just a continuation of the war.

We, Ukrainians, of course, strive for a complete victory – the collapse of the Russian Empire. But we cannot reject the option of a long-term (for years) cessation of the war, because this is an all-too-common way of ending wars in history. At the same time, peace, even in expectation of the next war, provides a chance for political change, for deep reforms, for full recovery, economic growth, and the return of citizens.

It is even possible to speak about the beginning of the formation of a safe, maximally protected state through innovation and technology. Formation and strengthening of the foundations of a just state through the fight against corruption and the creation of a fair court. Formation of the outlines of future peace on the basis of international economic programs for the country's recovery.

About security guarantees

Another important aspect of shaping a political goal today is security guarantees.

The very concept of ending war is not only obvious today, but also demanded for a number of reasons. These reasons are both regional and global in nature. The very path of implementing efforts to achieve this today, unfortunately, is unlikely. First of all, there are no prerequisites for this. Perhaps the main one is the ongoing active high-intensity hostilities and attacks on the economy from both sides.

That is why shifting the emphasis from ceasefire negotiations to concluding a final peace agreement makes it impossible for them to even be accepted in Ukraine due to unacceptable conditions for us. Because we have already paid too high a price.

Secondly, in conditions where the concept of international law and especially the system to support this law no longer exists, concluding such agreements without creating guarantees of long-term security is absolutely impossible.

Such security guarantees could include: Ukraine's accession to NATO, the deployment of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, or the deployment of a large military contingent capable of confronting Russia. However, there is no talk about this today. And taking into account the technological and doctrinal unpreparedness of any NATO member country, or any other country except Russia, Ukraine, and China, this issue cannot be considered in principle. And therefore, the war will probably continue. However, we should not forget that not only in the military, but also in the political and economic spheres.

Another aspect is the gradual reduction in the cost of war due to technological development, on the one hand, and the increase in total strike capabilities, on the other. This could lead to a situation where Russia will eventually need the same security guarantees. As strange as it may sound. Then, presumably, the basis of security guarantees should be capitals that can mutually guarantee their preservation. Which in turn will prevent collapse in the post-war years in both Ukraine and Russia. Because of course, such economic losses will also have political consequences. This was already at the beginning of the 20th century.

Therefore, formulating the political purpose of the war is the most difficult test for the thinking of a politician. Here the most erroneous ideas are possible. War is to a large extent a catalogue of blunders, said Winston Churchill.

However, perhaps the main political goal for Ukraine is to deprive Russia of the opportunity to carry out acts of aggression against Ukraine in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that Russia can implement such intentions by choosing one of two strategies. In any case, such an act of aggression will be carried out on both the military and political and economic fronts. The tools and forms of such aggression change, but they will all serve the same political goal.

If it is difficult to imagine the nature of the future war, it is clear exactly what the peace should be like, where our children should live. After all, as Olena Teliha said: "States do not stand on dynasties, but on the internal unity and strength of the people."