Xi has outplayed Trump: The Kremlin is actually surrendering Russia to China
Xi Jinping in Moscow.
The arrival of the Chinese leader on May 9 has a huge propaganda effect for the Kremlin. China is well aware of this and is trying to make the most of this visit. Especially since there are a number of issues in Russian-Chinese relations on which the Kremlin is in no hurry to meet Beijing halfway.
The first session of talks between Xi and Putin has taken place. And there is even a joint statement. Many beautiful words and formulations about a common future.
But there are a number of key points.
What you should pay attention to
1. There has been no increase in the level of relations between China and Russia. Let me remind you that the relations of "comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation" were enshrined in the 2001 agreement. Now the parties have announced their "deepening". But not about bringing them to a new level. Chinese diplomacy loves beautiful and long formulations and is sensitive to the meaning of every word. In this case, relations remained at the same level.
2. China pushed Russia to sign an agreement on mutual protection of investments. That is, it will be difficult for the Kremlin to play "nationalization of assets" with China if relations between the two countries deteriorate. For China, such agreements are important for the development of relations.
3. The joint declaration does not mention any problems with payments, but there is a paragraph on expanding payments in national currencies. Given that China blocks most transactions in Russian rubles, the "yuanization" of the Russian economy is accelerating.
4. The clause on expanding cooperation, in particular "in the areas of space and satellite navigation, nuclear energy, urban construction, healthcare, information and communication technologies", means that Russia has actually surrendered its positions in these areas. Construction is particularly interesting – it is doubtful that Russia will build anything in China. But the reverse process (as well as Chinese telecommunications equipment and Chinese control over communication systems) looks quite real.
5. Humanitarian component, including youth and education exchanges. Here, China, which is actively working to create its own system of soft power and operates through university programs, receives bonuses.
6. "Russia and China are in favor of adapting Eurasian regional interaction in the sphere of security, economy, culture and other areas to multipolar realities in the sphere of all states of the continent." Multipolar realities in China's view and in Russia's view are two big differences.
China sees only two global superpowers – itself and the United States. And the adaptation of "Eurasian interaction" (read: EAEU, CSTO, etc.) can only take place in the direction of convergence with the Chinese vision.
7. Points about the SCO – Russia recognizes China's primacy. Let me remind you that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was conceived and created by the Kremlin as a Russia-centered structure. By 2022, it had become almost entirely Sino-centered. And today's declaration only confirms this fact.
8. "The Parties... intend to take measures aimed at accelerating the process of establishing the Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent and the Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe." And this is the power component of the SCO, which may eventually replace the CSTO (or rather, it already does – for Central Asian countries).
9. The Kremlin has supported two of China's global geopolitical concepts – the "Global Development Initiative" and the "Concept of Building a Community of One Destiny for Humanity." They are nothing more than the basic framework of the conventionally "Chinese world".
10. Predictably, Russia and China have sharply opposed the US policy of maintaining/expanding their influence and, of course, against tariff wars and trade restrictions.
11. At the same time, the declaration contains separate paragraphs on Japan (relatively harsh wording that is more favorable to Russia), the Korean Peninsula (here the wording is more generalized, close to Beijing's rhetoric) and Afghanistan (clearly a Chinese track).
12. On the war against Ukraine. On the one hand, the statement contains the words "eliminate the root causes" that are favorable to the Kremlin. But at the same time, it also contains the wording "on the observance of the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety, totality and interrelation." Russia "welcomes China's desire to play a constructive role in the settlement through political and diplomatic means".
13. China will not finance Power of Siberia 2. But it is ready to buy more Russian gas (at a discount, as it is now) if Russia expands the capacity of the first Power of Siberia pipeline.
14. The point "to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation along the Northern Sea Route" means strengthening China's position in the Arctic. But this is not yet Beijing's victory – the bargaining with the United States continues. The victory will be the documents on China's unimpeded entry into the activities of "territories of advanced socio-economic development" and "territories of advanced development" in the northern part of the Russian Federation. (Let me remind you that these are special zones where there is not only a preferential tax regime, but also partially inoperative Russian migration legislation)
15. For the first time, the wording "the parties emphasize the potential for cooperation between the CSTO and China". For Russia, this is an opportunity to keep the CSTO from collapsing by keeping the participants from going for the Chinese prospects. China's interest is clear: to repeat the SCO trick. Unless, of course, the CSTO collapses by then.
Conclusions
Xi has maximized his visit to Russia on May 9 and is trying to keep Russia in China's sphere of influence before the US-China summit.
That is, to make Trump's attempt to turn Russia into a factor in deterring China's expansion futile.
At the same time, the Kremlin does not give up hope for the success of its track of negotiations with the United States. For this reason, they did not completely surrender the "Arctic" issues. For this reason (or, more precisely, for the sake of some kind of agreement on resources), they did not include the issue of resources in the joint declaration.
And finally, the important thing for us. China enters the negotiation process on Ukraine.
Trump has recognized this, by the way. I wrote about this possibility, or rather about the logic of the processes and that it will inevitably happen, in my December 2025 forecast.
But China's entry into negotiations on Ukraine will not be immediate. It is important for China to enter the preparations for the US-China summit with new introductions.
It is important for Trump (particularly given the failure of the tariff blackmail policy, the failure in the Middle East, and the failure of his ideas for peace in Ukraine but the success of the resource deal) to develop or update his own agenda for the meeting.
For Russia, this means that it has time to conduct a summer campaign. That is, for another attempt to achieve a breakthrough on the front line.
And closer to the fall, other processes will begin.
