Comrade Xi's Paranoia: How Military Purges in China Affect the Russian-Ukrainian War

The mass purges in the Chinese army are Beijing's direct response to Russia's war against Ukraine – and preparation for scenarios in which China cannot afford Moscow's defeat.

LIGA.net explains why Xi Jinping is breaking the military chain of command and what real risks this creates for Ukraine.

Scenario One: Concentration of Power in Xi's Hands

On January 24, China's Ministry of Defense removed and launched a corruption investigation against the top brass of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.

Zhang was considered a loyal ally of Xi Jinping, the son of his father's friend, a "red prince" who was an authority in the army.

China's Ministry of Defense stated that Zhang, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) that controls the army, is under investigation for violating discipline and the law. Liu Zhenli, a lower-ranking member of the CMC who headed the Joint Staff Department, is also under investigation.

An editorial in the "People's Liberation Army Daily," the army's mouthpiece, stated that 75-year-old Zhang was accused of corruption and disloyalty to Xi.

The official reasons for the decision were announced in another publication – the Communist Party's mouthpiece, "Narodna Gazeta". Among them: "betrayal of the party's trust, corruption, the need to cleanse the army of unsuitable elements."

The actions against Zhang and Liu are openly called a purge, says LIGA.net Vita Golod, a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists.

The probable real reason for the purges is the delay in the combat readiness schedule for the 100th anniversary of the PLA in 2027. This is also the year when the army is supposed to be ready for a war over Taiwan, says LIGA.net Yuriy Poyta, head of the Asia-Pacific Section at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.

Usually, for failing to adhere to the army's training schedule, generals are quietly sent into honorable retirement. Instead, the 72-year-old Xi used the full spectrum of coercion to isolate, politically neutralize, and prevent Zhang from any further activity.

"It's not necessary that Zhang actually wanted to seize power. A person in the US who knew and accepted him assures that he has flexible thinking, a sharp mind, and popularity in the army," says Poyta.

Perhaps it is partly about Xi's paranoia of losing power, adds Golod. He changed the constitution and can remain in power indefinitely. This resignation can be interpreted as a guarantee of security for his regime.

This is a signal that no one is untouchable. Zhang was not just a general, but someone who had known Xi since childhood. However, in academic circles in China, the other side is being discussed – Xi may be strong, but he is isolated in terms of information. This is a typical problem of authoritarian regimes, says Golod.

Xi's decision leaves him at the top of China's military hierarchy and power. The purge reshapes the army to his worldview, prioritizing loyalty. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has consolidated power through purges and anti-corruption campaigns, and has become the most influential leader in a decade, writes the NYT.

After a wave of purges, only two of the seven members of the Central Military Commission approved in 2022 remain: Xi and General Zhang Shengming, who is responsible for discipline and anti-corruption checks. Xi holds a concentration of power not only over politics but also over the army. The PLA is the only institution that can guarantee the stability of the regime or threaten it," says Golod.

Scenario Two: Weakening the Army

Zhang was a key figure in the military hierarchy that made decisions regarding Taiwan. In this logic, his removal increases uncertainty. In Taipei, the news was received rather positively. But the issue of the island has not been removed from the agenda.

"Zhang's resignation postpones a direct invasion. Mass purges undermine the trust, initiative, and morale of officers. Even if the Central Military Commission is rebooted with younger, technocratic personnel, an atmosphere of fear does not foster effectiveness. We need to wait and see who comes in their place, and only then analyze the new composition of the council," says Golod.

"The removal of Zhang means that there will be no general who would dare to object to Xi's military adventure when the time comes. This increases the risk of miscalculation," says Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at SOAS, University of London.

Beijing has long harbored ambitions for Taiwan, a de facto independent country of 23 million people. Taiwan's Defense Minister Wellington Koo said that Taipei is closely monitoring abnormal changes in China's military leadership and trying to understand Beijing's intentions.

"Xi will not give the order to invade unless he is confident of victory, but no general now dares to contradict him," says Tsang.

The PLA is constantly increasing its combat potential, building 20 new ships every year, and conducting increasingly intensive exercises around Taiwan, says Poyta. Some analysts say that the PLA is not ready for joint operations, where aviation, navy, and infantry act together, but this issue is being resolved.

"Regardless of the arrests, the army's potential is being strengthened. The consequence may be a temporary weakening of the morale of senior officers, increased distrust, and fear of repression, but China's approach to war – to overcome quality with quantity – remains," says Poyta.

Scenario Three: The Ukrainian Model for the Chinese Army

To prepare for a war over Taiwan, the Chinese military is actively studying the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It shows that on the modern battlefield, the military needs decentralization and the transfer of initiative to small units, says Poyta.

But the initiative from below contradicts the philosophy of the Communist Party, where the army must protect the party and follow orders from above. So even hypothetical attempts by Zhang to form a corresponding modern military structure could have provoked a conflict.

Even if the generals don't trust each other, the authorities won't necessarily take that into account. The military is now even more likely to say that they are ready to carry out the tasks set by the authorities, regardless of the army's level of readiness.

Xi may abandon the idea of war in 2027. Presidential elections will be held in Taiwan in 2028. The pro-Beijing Kuomintang party is strengthening its position on the island. If its leader, Chen Li-wan, comes to power, Xi may not go for a risky war, but gradually integrate the island through political and diplomatic means.

Consequences

Despite the prospects for peaceful coexistence between China and Taiwan, Beijing is preparing its military potential, including its industry, which requires additional resources. Therefore, it will buy oil and gas from Russia. As part of its preparations for a possible war, it needs stable relations and cooperation with Moscow.

China is not interested in showing weakness or distancing itself from Russia. At the same time, the restructuring of the army means greater caution in sensitive issues of military-technical cooperation, especially where there are high risks of leaks or international scandals, says Golod:

"Zhang has only visited three countries while in office – Venezuela, Pakistan, and Russia," she clarifies. "Despite the fact that Sino-Russian relations are currently formally at their highest level, historically they have had serious cracks. Beijing remembers this."

Furthermore, China does not want allies to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a war. Therefore, it is entirely in Beijing's interest for Russia to attack NATO. "For this to happen, Moscow needs to have the strength, so Beijing will continue to support the Russians," adds Poyta.

As for Chinese dual-use goods purchased by Russia, such flows will continue to be part of the "sanctions game," as Western export controls are effectively not working.

China controls 70–90% of the global market for civilian drones, depending on the category. This is an economic benefit – in 2024, it received $9.7 billion in profit from the sale of commercial UAVs, and an opportunity to test technologies on the Russian and Ukrainian sides, says Golod.

This means, for example, that the Russians will feel more at ease with drone technologies, and in particular with fiber-optic drones, which remain top strike copters on the battlefield.

Fiber optic exports from China to Russia have sharply increased. increased in mid-2025 – from 190,000 km in May to a record 528,000 km in August 2025 (Ukraine was only able to buy 115 km from China). The August volume alone is enough to equip approximately 26,240 Russian drones.

In the first half of 2025, China sold $1.9 billion worth of dual-use goods to Russia. Drone engine exports rose to $105 million in the first half of 2025, compared to $25 million in the same period of 2024. Lithium-ion battery exports peaked at $54 million in June 2025, then settled at $47 million in August – a similar figure for Ukraine was $12 million during the same summer period.

As long as Beijing remotely studies new types of warfare while maintaining a formally neutral status, it will continue this policy.