Putin in Beijing: the policy of the Kremlin's new "big brother" and why it should be taken into account
So, the parade in Moscow and the visit of Xi Jinping in general have recorded the political reality: Russia is a vassal of China, a satellite country that exists exclusively in the orbit of the "big brother".
Unlike Orbán and Fico, who can still maneuver between Brussels, Moscow and Washington; unlike the Central Asian countries, which can balance between Moscow and Beijing, Putin has nowhere to maneuver, no one to balance with.
The game of multipolar world has ended in a dead end for Russia.
As predicted back in 2022, a player with all the cards in his hands enters the arena. They have been there for a long time, but it was not enough to wait for three bloody years. China must have its say, but what will it be like?
China's strategic goal is world domination, disguised as a "Community of the Common Destiny of Humanity".
This idea, which is the official foreign policy doctrine of China, is based on the understanding that the world is facing global challenges that cannot be solved alone, so it is better to deal with them together under the leadership of a "big brother," the strongest and wisest. Guess who this big brother is .
(In general, the Chinese view of the world is that China has always been the leading civilization of mankind, but it has been humiliated from this position in the last 200 years, and now it is returning to its rightful place. This is not true: China was the leading civilization for 1200 years, roughly from 550 to 1750, but the rest of the time, during the more or less studied 15,000-year history of mankind, it was lagging behind)
What is China's Strategy for the Russian-Ukrainian War?
Does China need Russia's victory? No, it doesn't, because it would mean that Russia would become stronger, gain greater status, and consolidate in international practice the right of the strong to change the borders of the weak. China does not need this.
Does China need Russia's defeat? No, because it means the strengthening of the Western world, of which Ukraine is certainly a part. Russia's defeat also means the likely disintegration of Russia, after which different parts of it will try to distance themselves from China (the Turkic and Mongolian peoples fear and hate it), while some other parts will happily fall into China's arms.
So, maybe China needs endless continuation of the war? No, because it increases risks against the backdrop of negative economic dynamics.
So which is the best option for China?
And the one we have now. The war continues, but no one is winning. The war continues, but resources for warfare are running out. At the same time, everyone is afraid of escalation, and this pushes the weak into China's arms, and forces the strong to make mistakes.
In China's interest, Russia is weak but aggressive; coherent but completely dependent; endless war but not hot; the ability to manage uncertainty and deprive others of that ability; the ability to use Russia as a battering ram but stay behind the scenes, collecting the spoils.
From this point of view, everything is going well for China.
1. Russia cannot win.
2. Russia is unable to stop and will continue.
3. China is not explicitly entering the war, but Russia cannot continue without it. China can flexibly manage the intensity of events.
4. Russia has no maneuver, cannot balance between China and anyone else.
5. Russia's Allies, Vassals and Satellites are Moving to China All at Once.
6. The United States is losing this round outright. Europe is confused.
7. The whole world understands who to negotiate with here.
Key Chinese Issues:
- economic slowdown, rising unemployment,
- significant dependence on exports,
- the middle-income trap: wages are rising, now China is no longer a "cheap workshop",
- population aging, stopping demographic growth,
- strong imbalance between men and women,
- constant need for cheap resources.
Therefore, China's strategy toward Russia will combine:
- gradual gaining control over Russian resources: real control without political responsibility, which can be ensured through Chinese companies and joint projects,
- demographic penetration in Russian regions,
- direct political control over certain regions without invasion, through concessions, etc .
What does Ukrainian interest look like then?
It is in our interest that Russia collapses and cannot serve as a Chinese tool, but that it does so neatly and not chaotically, before China takes control.
