Trump-style peace: why the Gaza scheme is failing in Ukraine

Prior to Trump's "peacemaking," attempts to see something in common between the Israeli-Hamas war and the Russian-Ukrainian war were largely meaningless. However, the recent agreement to end hostilities in the Gaza Strip directly and textbook reflects Trump's own vision of what such agreements might look like, what they should be based on, and how they should be organized.

So, let's take an anatomical look at what a Trumpian end to the war is, using the example of Israel and Hamas. I emphasize that my analysis below is an analysis of the architecture of the "deal," not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, it will become clear that Trump is trying to apply the key techniques of the approach that worked in the Middle East to the case of Ukraine and Russia. And it will become clear why this is not working in this case .

So, first of all, the main thing in Trump's scheme is to obtain the parties' agreement in principle to end the war or hostilities. This is not and should not be preceded, from the point of view of the US administration, by any analysis of mutual interests and the balance of power.

So for Trump, it does not matter whether the parties agree to a ceasefire because it is in their interest, or whether Trump will force these parties, or one of them, to a ceasefire by using the tools of influence that Donald Trump, or rather America under his leadership, has. In the case of Israel and Hamas, the "coercion" was relatively mild, in my opinion, and the key to the parties' agreement was their interest, both Israel and Hamas, albeit for completely different reasons, to end the active phase of hostilities.

Point number two: the ceasefire, or rather the agreement of both sides to cease fire, is followed by a conversation about some details. But it is very important that these details – how the ceasefire will be maintained, whether there will be sanctions for its violation, whether there will be reconstruction, and what the relations between the warring parties will be based on – all of this can be part of the roadmap, but it is not necessary. This is secondary.

Point number three: Trump's approach emphasizes the proclamation of a ceasefire, not its observance. The mechanisms will have vague wording, without any clear algorithms. Donald Trump is not interested in whether the ceasefire will be sustainable.

And the fourth point that I highlight in this scheme is the specifics of formalizing such an agreement. It is clear that when you are focused on the ceasefire itself and guarantees of compliance with this ceasefire are not the central element of your plan, the model for fixing such an agreement between the parties will also be as political as possible, not legal.

In other words, a principled political declaration, political agreement or plan on paper is sufficient, but without the status of an international treaty, without a legally binding element. On the contrary, formal, declarative support from a mediator or mediators is required.

The way the formal part of the truce between Hamas and Israel was organized clearly reflects this logic and scheme.

Thus, Israel and Hamas did not sign an international peace treaty. On the contrary, they signed an agreement called "Implementation of Steps to Implement President Donald Trump's Peace Plan for a 'Comprehensive End to the War in Gaza'". These steps gained internal political legitimacy in Israel due to the vote of government members in support of such an agreement. In addition, the Trump Plan itself contains many more points than Hamas and Israel have agreed upon – indirectly, by the way -.

But the pompous procedure of signing a "peace agreement" by the leaders of the United States, Qatar, Turkey and Egypt is the signing of a Declaration in support of this agreement to end the war.

And if we leave aside the details of the US-Russian and US-Ukrainian roller coaster, we will see that this is exactly the scheme Trump is trying to apply with renewed vigor to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Consent, no matter what Donbas and Zaporizhzhia are, because should this prevent a great and beautiful agreement to end the war? To get this agreement, the parties continue to flirt with Russia (which, according to the Americans, should be persuaded, not forced) and put new pressure, albeit lesser, on Ukraine. And this logic does not accept calls for guarantees or at least assurances of security. Because this is secondary.

But in the case of Ukraine and Russia, Trump's scheme falls apart at point 1 – there is no principled agreement by Russia to end the war. And this is clear to Trump himself. Russia needs Ukraine's political surrender on the status of the territories, on control of the Donetsk region, on restrictions on the size and armament of the army, not to mention defense alliances or the Russian language. Such a "price" for Russia's ephemeral agreement to the alleged ceasefire is too high and unjustified for Ukraine. For all the problems with standing your ground.

Israel, by the way, has agreed, without legal obligations, to almost everything it has resisted for so long and stubbornly: the withdrawal of troops from Gaza, the release of prisoners and detainees, and Palestinian administration of Gaza. Russia is not even close to conceding, and why should it? The United States is not trying to put pressure on it, at least not as gently as it did with Israel.

Thus, inspired by his victory in the Gaza negotiations, Trump is blindly trying to apply the same approach to Russia and Ukraine. However, the similarities between the wars between Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Israel and Hamas, on the other, end there. As well as the prospects for the American president to win a victory as resounding as his own if the strategy is not adapted to the context and players.

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