Eight factors that constrain NATO

I have no expectations about the NATO Summit. Because at the heart of everything that is happening is one big fundamental uncertainty: the future of Northern Eurasia. The United States and Europe do not understand what to do with Russia. They no longer believe in democracy in Russia (I hope), they are afraid of autocracy (because it means war and the rise of China), they are even more afraid of collapse (because it means chaos and the rise of China), and they do not agree to decolonization (yet). And as long as this great uncertainty exists, as long as there is no picture of the post-war world, the war will not end completely. And until the war is finally over, NATO will not join it as a full-fledged participant. Thus, Ukraine's prospects will be sincere, generous, but remain vague promises nonetheless.

Of course, other factors are also important. Domestic political uncertainty in the United States (not only about party competition, but also about the balance between domestic and foreign affairs).

The uncertainty of the balance between the US and Europe within NATO itself (Europe is used to doing less and getting more).

Ukraine's failure to complete its homework (no one wants a large country with a large army and an unstable democracy).

Turkish ambitions that go far beyond the previous decades.

Hungarian opportunism, which everyone is tired of but doesn't know what to do about.

German uncertainty about how steep the Zeitenwende (end of an era; turning point in history) will be, and the confrontation between supporters of a steep and a soft turn.

The general crisis of global institutions, with which it is unclear what to do.

But the main uncertainty is the fate of Russia and the picture of the post-war world. NATO was created to counter the Soviet threat, then the threat disappeared, and NATO relaxed and dissipated. And now, in fact, we need to determine what the next 50 years will look like. There is no common picture, so there are no expectations.