Why Europe must pay for security if it wants to have geopolitical weight
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance calls on Europe to "step up and take a more active role" in Ukraine, but the EU "does not have the strength" to support Ukraine and ensure favorable conditions for ending the war, Western media report.
What Vance means?
We are talking about European expenditures, i.e. money: "If you care so much about this conflict, you should be prepared to play a more direct and substantial role in financing this war," he said .
Given Europe's actual spending on the war in Ukraine in terms of arms purchases and the region's GDP, Europe spends no more than 0.2% of its GDP on the war. If this war is a matter of personal security for Europe, because it is taking place on the territory of its strategic security buffer – Ukraine, then 0.2% is very little.
The expenditures of almost all European countries that are members of NATO on defense, i.e. their own security, are much higher – 2%. So why the difference between 0.2% and 2%? How did Europe perceive its role and corresponding expenditures during Russia's war on the territory of the strategic security buffer? Or even the idea of it should have been formed in Washington?
Europe must finally answer the main current questions about the war frankly: Is Europe afraid of an escalation from Russia toward it or of the collapse of the Russian Federation as a result of providing much more aid to Ukraine? Is Europe afraid of being left alone with Russia by the US?
Perhaps this call by Vance for Europe to take on the financing of the war in Ukraine, while Trump is simultaneously seeking to end it, is a test, even provocative, thesis for Europe. Why?
If Europe responds positively, Washington can conclude that if Europe is ready to assume responsibility – at least financial responsibility – then it is time to ask Europe the next question that the EU has been avoiding since its inception.
And is Europe ready to take on the military and political responsibility for ending the war in Ukraine, and therefore for its own security? This is the fundamental question that can lead Europe into a state of stupor.
Now, as at any time in history, it is not. That is why Vance reminds us of this with his theses. He reminds us of what has been well known in Washington since the 1950s – Europe is looking for guidance, direction from the United States, not responsibility. Vance is playing with Europe by pressing on well-known fundamental points of influence on its political body.
In order to have autonomy in geopolitics, Europe should have strived for it. It has had enough time since 1991, the end of the Cold War, but it has not used it.
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