Kherson is in a drone cordon. What to do

The news flow included information that the Ukrainian authorities had recognized the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway as impassable, blocked by Russian drones. This means that the main transportation artery that used to feed this regional center is now out of service. Kherson is officially under drone cordon.

In all of this, I am, of course, surprised by the tardiness of such a statement.

It occurred after a car carrying prosecutors and a car carrying doctors were hit. But these incidents are far from the first to occur on this highway, as Russians have flown to it before.

Moreover, it was clear and obvious that the Russians would block this highway. It's just that we have a tradition of delaying bad news for our bosses and for the population, which leads to things getting so bad that they can no longer be kept quiet. But who will be responsible for the victims?

The route is about 20 kilometers from the Muscovites' forward positions. FPV drones, whether Ukrainian or Russian, with the necessary modifications, can now reach 30 kilometers or more. The only alternative road to supply Kherson is the one that goes through Muzykivka to the north, which is only 8 kilometers further along the route that has already been blocked by Moscow's UAVs. The conclusions are easy to draw on your own, and the consequences are easy to predict.

Why am I writing this now? Because I hope that using the painful and great example of the blocked (partially) Kherson, the authorities and society will understand the nature of the danger that is inevitably looming over all frontline cities, even if they are relatively far from the frontline itself.

This danger is formulated as follows: roads tens of kilometers deep either already exist or will soon be impassable.

This is already the case in small towns in Donbas. Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kostiantynivka have already been done, and Druzhkivka, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk are next in line. Further question marks should be placed around Sumy and Kharkiv. And not only, and not only..

The technology of kamikaze drones is far from being exhausted, technical progress continues, and battery capacity, efficiency, and autonomy of drones are still steadily increasing. Their tactical radius is growing.

So, for example, we will soon be blocking the land corridor to Crimea. My friends are already successfully working there, taking on the fattest targets – freight trains – and then their long "arms" will reach the road transport. Unfortunately, the Russians are not far behind, as we can see from Kherson.

What I propose?

At the very least, the problem is complex and worthy of a separate NSDC meeting with the president at the helm. I can even outline the agenda.

First, I would look into why the most advanced technological solutions that are currently available in Ukraine are deployed in Kherson the way they are. Are these advanced units being assisted in everything they need and can be assisted in?

And in general, we should assess the power allocated to the defense of Kherson against drones. Let the president find out: what percentage of soldiers are in the garrison covering Kherson? What percentage of funding do they receive and from where? What are they complaining about?

There will be a lot of interesting things.

Secondly, I would ask the military, who have competence in the field of drones, how we should organize the defense of frontline cities. Who should be in charge of countering the main means of defeating the enemy – drones? I don't want to offend other branches of the military, but it should be the UAV troops who have the best competencies in this area and who should be leading the frontline areas right now.

So that they are not commanded by incompetent officers, but vice versa. This is not difficult. The level of understanding of the UAV sphere can be found out by conducting a 5-minute interview with relevant military officials.

Finally, the third.

Technological solutions should be developed urgently. For the frontline cities to survive, we need to develop new means and use them to shape the tactics of the military.

Unfortunately, we do not see any systematic work of officials on the example of the resonant topic of the Shahed. It is not clear that they have learned the "shahed" lesson, when we started looking for countermeasures too late, and have not yet developed the state's ability to respond to similar problems in advance.

A public initiative, a coalition of grassroots initiatives from the military, volunteers, and manufacturers, is now fighting the Shahed, and is initiating changes in the "upper" governing bodies. With the roads in the rear, it seems that we are facing the same fate.

We need to realize that the war of drones is won by the one who has the best defense against them. Therefore, we should make as much noise as possible to make officials realize this truth and act now.

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