The current course of the war is a consequence of the wrong conclusions of 2022

There are many different attempts to understand why we ended up where we are after Russia expanded its aggression on February 24, 2022.
The answer to this question has many components, as befits such a complex socio-political phenomenon as war. But in my opinion, in particular, we are in this state of affairs, not another, because we failed to honestly analyze why we succeeded in 2022 (and Russia did not), and, as a result, drew slightly wrong conclusions.
Let me start with a false conclusion – the idea that since the outcome of the February-October 2022 campaign was in Ukraine's favor, it means that Ukraine has successfully mastered the unique art of strategy and strategic activity. This was the conclusion both within the country and among partners.
And, accordingly, if we did quite well in 2022, we will continue to do so. Does it make sense? It makes sense !
However, in reality, the result of the February-October 2022 campaign was a combination of a unique set of circumstances, the key ones being:
the mistakes of our enemy, who tried to do many times more than he had the strength to do;
a number of Ukraine's advantages, including grassroots initiative and a trained reserve;
Western support and the use of new weapons such as the M142/270.
And when the variables in the equation began to change in our favor, it turned out that success was not automatically guaranteed.
When the Russian Federation found ways to systematically engage personnel and developed a military strategy proportional to available resources, technologies and tactics, it turned out that Russia is a very serious enemy, and the successes of 2022 are difficult to repeat.
And strategy and strategic activity is an art that the state, revived in 1991, still has to master and master.
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