What are Russia's goals for 2026?

After the defeat near Kyiv and the retreat in 2022, Russia failed to achieve four strategic goals: the political destabilization of Ukraine, economic and energy exhaustion, the division of society, and the undermining of international support. The only thing left for the Russian Federation is the presence of its army in parts of Ukrainian territories. However, Russia has not achieved its goals on the front either.

The Russian economy is weakened, the army is suffering heavy losses, and the regime and elites exist only thanks to the war, which is ideologically fueled by propaganda.

That is why 2026 will be a year of hybrid escalation.

Putin doesn't know what peace is, unless it's the "surrender of Ukraine," which won't happen. Therefore, continued escalation for the Russian Federation is inevitable under any scenario.

In 2026, Russia will act in several directions.

1. Sabotage – strikes (diversions) against the European defense industry, logistics, and supply chains of weapons to Ukraine. The first attempts have already taken place: the undermining of railway tracks in Poland, and fires at defense enterprises in Europe. This activity is carried out by the GRU and the SVR of the Russian Federation.

2. Disinformation and cognitive warfare – maximum pressure during elections in Europe, particularly in Hungary, and in the US elections – is inevitable. Propaganda funding is growing by billions.

3. Coercion and intimidation – systemic military demonstrations, violations of air and sea space, nuclear rhetoric as a tool of psychological pressure, "nutcrackers" – a traditional strategy of fear for ultimatums in diplomacy.

However, it is important to understand that Russia's war economy is not viable without the support of the Global South. Real military spending is approaching late Soviet levels, oil and gas revenues have fallen by a third, the sovereign fund is dwindling, and the war costs significantly more than the Kremlin publicly admits. A pause is beneficial for Russia.

Conventional capabilities are being exhausted: the pace of the offensive is measured in tens of meters per day, losses in the hundreds of thousands, Soviet equipment stocks are running out, and new production does not cover the losses, although Russia is increasing the number of missiles, drones, tanks, and helicopters.

At the same time, Europe has not yet built a full-fledged deterrent against hybrid attacks – sabotage, cyberattacks, and diversions are often perceived as separate "incidents" rather than elements of a systemic war. Europe avoids reality, militarization is extremely slow, and society's readiness for threats is unsatisfactory. The system for countering disinformation is suited to peacetime, not the active cognitive war that the Russian Federation has been actively waging against Europe for several years.

The West's strategic choice is simple: double down on pressure if Putin's regime chooses war.

Restrictions on the Russian military-industrial complex, if Russia chooses peace.

The formula in which Putin hides behind peace and continues militarization guarantees an even bigger war over time.

Putin is betting that the West is not prepared to punish Russia below the threshold of Article 5.

The year 2026 will show whether Europe has learned this lesson – or whether the Kremlin will try to break the West with hybrid means where it failed militarily. And then it will launch a new offensive against Europe.

Original