A lot of carrots and not enough sticks. How Russia is trying to integrate the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region

The occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions have been a bargaining chip in the negotiations between Russia and the United States for several months. Russia has been allegedly agreeing to withdraw from these territories in exchange for control of the Donetsk region, and then demanding that Ukraine give up both regions in full. Ukraine's position has not changed: withdrawal from these areas is impossible.

The occupation, in particular of the Zaporizhzhia region, has been going on for almost four years, and all this time Russia has been trying to integrate it into its state system. Local schools are teaching lessons about "Lenin's artificial creation of Ukraine" and actually forcing parents to send their children to the "Unarmy" by threatening them with problems for disloyalty. The Russians are creating incentive programs to encourage teachers and doctors from the Russian hinterland to move to the occupied territories, and deporting locals who have not yet received Russian passports.

Journalist Yuliana Skibitska and her French colleague Clara Marcoude talked to people who are involved in the occupied territories. Here is what life looks like in the uncontrolled part of Zaporizhzhia region.

Twenty-year-old Danylo (we changed his name at the request of the hero, because his relatives remain under occupation) left Melitopol in the summer of 2022. He wanted to leave on February 24, when he heard the first explosions. He didn't have time. The next day, columns of Russian tanks passed through Melitopol. The soldiers, Danylo recalls, were not aggressive. They calmly talked to the locals, saying: in a few days we will leave, everything will be as before.

Everything changed in a few weeks. on March 13, the Russians broke up a rally in support of the then-mayor of Enerhodar, Ivan Fedorov, who was in captivity. In May 2022, the occupiers were already looking for the most proactive people. They dressed in civilian clothes and came to the evacuation buses to see who was going to leave. Danylo says that it was then that it finally became clear that the occupation would be long.

In September, pseudo-referendums were held in the occupied territories. Putin signed a decree on the "accession of four new regions," but then the situation on the front was constantly changing. In September, the Ukrainian military liberated Kharkiv region, in November – Kherson, and Russia lost the only regional center it was able to capture. LIGA.net's interlocutors say that the active integration of the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region began in 2023.

Part one. Power

The beginning of the occupation. Chaos

"In the beginning, in 2022, the occupation authorities were formed as follows: after the Russian military captured the city, the commandant's office of the Federal Security Service would visit. The officers had lists of local officials, deputies, and leaders. They called them for "conversations" and offered to stay, saying: "You are the local authorities, you were elected, stay, Russia is here forever," says journalist and head of the Zaporizhzhia Investigative Center Serhiy Sydorov.

Before the full-scale invasion, the Zaporizhzhia Investigative Center covered corruption in tenders and local budgets. When the occupation began, the journalists collected information from local social media, telegram channels, news from friends, as well as through the network of contacts of those who had left, and communicated with those who remained.

"We studied who exactly remained among the leadership team – community heads, council secretaries, deputies, deputies," Sydorov continues, "and it turned out that the larger the city, the fewer people cooperated. In large cities such as Berdiansk, Melitopol, Enerhodar, Vasylivka, most officials left. The smaller the city, the more locals stayed. In Prymorsk or Kyrylivka, for example, the situation was calmer, people did not panic and stayed more often."

Serhii is sure that it was not because the south of the region was more loyal to Russia. In villages and communities, local heads often stayed because they believed they had to stay with the people to the end. Some were simply afraid. Those who refused to cooperate were often abducted and tortured by the Russians. This happened to the mayor of Enerhodar, Ivan Fedorov, and the mayor of Dniprorudne, Yevhen Matveev. The latter was not released from captivity. He died in a Russian detention center after being systematically tortured.

The situation was different in large cities. Representatives of pro-Russian parties such as Nash Krai, Opposition Platform for Life, and the Opposition Bloc remained there. Almost immediately after the occupation, they declared their loyalty to the new government and were given managerial positions.

Thus, Yevhen Balytskyi became the "governor of Zaporizhzhia region". Melitopol, which was appointed the administrative center of the region by the occupiers, was headed by his close associate Halyna Danylchenko. The housing and communal services in Melitopol were managed by a former local deputy from the OPFL, Serhiy Zolotarev, who replaced his associate Danylchenko in 2025. And the new local government in Enerhodar was headed by Andriy Shevchyk, a member of the OPFL.

The process of finding people willing to cooperate with the Russians was chaotic. Often, random people were given "positions". For example, Natalia Romanichenko, who had a production center for children in Zaporizhzhia and sold sausages and homemade dumplings on social media, was appointed "mayor of Vasylivka." Berdiansk was "headed" by Oleksandr Saulenko, a local small businessman and failed politician who was looking for a job as a labor protection engineer before the invasion.

Balytsky and his path to power

"Balytsky has always been in the shadows, but close to the authorities," says Serhiy Sydorov: "give him a little influence and let him get out of the way." He had representation in the regional council, a certain faction in the Melitopol city council."

Balytskyi comes from a military family. He studied at an aviation school in Tambov, served as a pilot for four years, and eventually returned to Melitopol. His family was engaged in a business typical of the nineties – buying up old factories for next to nothing, then reselling them or taking loans from the state "for development and restoration."

"The Balytsky's used to say that business and politics go hand in hand," says Svitlana Zalizetska, director of the RIA Pivden website, "That's why they always had their own media. Svitlana knows Balytskyi well, having worked for his radio station Yuzhnyi Prostir and his TV channel MTV-plus, which was one of the largest TV companies in Zaporizhzhia region before the occupation.

"But he was more of an administrative official than a businessman," adds Serhiy Sydorov, "He always wanted to be an important person. He had a certain nostalgia for the Soviet past: he liked to wear his old uniform to city celebrations, take pictures, and talk about "common history" and "grandfathers who fought."

Balytskyi first became a deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Council in 1998. Seven years later, he joined the newly created Party of Regions and ran for mayor of Melitopol, but was unsuccessful. In 2012, Balytsky won in a majority constituency and was elected to the Verkhovna Rada. He also won in the same constituency in 2014, when the fragments of the Party of Regions created the Opposition Bloc. Balytskyi did not have a third victory – he lost to the then-mayor of Melitopol, Serhiy Minko, and returned to the Zaporizhzhia Regional Council.

"He [Balytsky] was very ambitious," says Zalizetska, "He always said, 'I will become president of Ukraine. After the full-scale invasion, it was clear to me that this man would be in charge of everything."

Strengthening the occupation. Changes

After appointing local collaborators, the FSB commandant's office in the occupied territories began demanding lists of ATO participants, former military, activists, and people who helped the Ukrainian army. Local officials passed these lists to the security forces, but did not personally participate in the torture. "Those were difficult and bloody months," says Sidorov.

After the pseudo-referendums, the Russians realized that the Ukrainian collaborators were not doing their job. They lacked skills, connections, and experience in the "systemic" Russian bureaucracy. They were replaced by officials from the Russian Federation.

anton Koltsov, the vice-governor of Vologda Oblast, became the "head of the government of Zaporizhzhia Oblast", while the so-called ministers of the occupied part of the region are politicians from Russia or occupied Crimea. Balytsky has a new deputy, Russian FSB officer Artur Saidov. The role of the "governor" himself has become more of a symbolic one, says Sidorov. He remains "in office" because it is important for Russians to keep local faces to demonstrate the alleged legitimacy of the government. Perhaps he was even allowed to have his own cash flow. But all important decisions are made exclusively by people from Moscow.

There is no consensus among the collaborators themselves. Volodymyr Rogov, who led the separatist movement in Zaporizhzhia in 2014 and then fled to Russia, wanted to be the "governor of Zaporizhzhia region" himself, but became only an ordinary member of the "Main Council of the Zaporizhzhia Region Administration". Since then, Rogov has dedicated every second post in his telegram channel to Balytsky. Mostly, these are accusations of loyalty to the Ukrainian authorities in the past and corruption.

Personnel changes also affected other areas. People from Russia began to fill the judiciary, police, and courts. There were very few local lawyers or judges left, says Serhiy Sydorov, because they could not work under Russian law. Gradually, those who worked in finance, utilities, media, or social security were also replaced. This is how the system was finally subordinated to Moscow.

Part Two. Propaganda

Recruitment of young people

On November 3 this year, the Melitopol propaganda telegram channel wrote that a lecture on "Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Educational Sphere and Youth Environment" was held for high school students in one of the schools. The organizer was the "Department of Culture, Sports and Youth Policy of the Administration of the City District of Melitopol". The title of the presentation was "Why is history becoming an instrument of information warfare?" and one of the topics was "Lenin's artificial creation of Ukraine". This event clearly illustrates what the occupation authorities are banking on – and this is, first and foremost, the youth.

The Russians began actively working with teenagers in the first six months of the occupation. In July 2022, this work was formalized into the organization "Yug Molodoy". Its director is now 20-year-old Yulia Klymenko, who in 2022 was still studying at a Melitopol school. First, Yulia became the head of the Volunteers of Russia movement, then the youth wing of Putin's United Russia party.

"Yug Molodoy is engaged in "educational and patriotic work" and even publishes its own magazine. Members plant roses, distribute St. George's ribbons, greet World War II veterans, and write letters to the Russian military. Now in the occupied territories act there are dozens of similar organizations. However, they are mostly joined by the same people. Even the official website of Yug Molodiy talks about only a thousand participants from all the occupied territories, and according to Svitlana Zalizetska, the same faces are always present at propaganda events.

The second important aspect of working with young people is their militarization. This task is largely entrusted to the Yunarmiya. Created back in 2016, during Russia's full-scale war with Ukraine, the Yunarmiya became one of the main tools of military propaganda. In 2025, one billion rubles were allocated for its work. "The Yunarmiya is more than a game of soldiers," the Russian propaganda website writes, "Yunarmiyas take part in military-patriotic events, do drill training, and learn the mechanics of working with weapons. But they do not stop there and support the participants of the special military operation."

In the Unarmy, children learn to shoot, train with the Russian military, participate in Victory Day parades, and collect aid for Russian soldiers at the front. While until 2022, the "Unarmy" in the occupied territories was rather formal, now children are actively involved in the movement. The age of entry has been reduced from 14 to eight. For children from the newly occupied territories and orphans there is a separate program called "Youth. Mentoring". Often parents send their children to the Unarmy to avoid problems with the occupation authorities, who carefully check the involvement of schoolchildren in the movement. The strategy is working well for Russians – as of 2024, the Unarmy entered about 35 thousand children from the temporarily occupied territories.

Education

Education is another priority area of work with young people. Olena Shapurova has been involved in it for a long time. Before the full-scale war, she was the director of the Melitopol Industrial and Economic College for about ten years. In 2020, the RIA Melitopol website wrote about conflicts within the college – Shapurova was accused of unlawful dismissals and corruption. However, at the time of the occupation, Shapurova was still listed as the director of the college. According to her, on March 14, representatives of the "new local authorities" called her and offered to head the "Melitopol Department of Education".

"Shapurova persuaded local school principals to cooperate with the occupation authorities, but they did not agree," says Zalizetska. "Then she began to appoint principals herself, people close to her. Her husband, a former athlete Roman Dziuba, became the principal of the 15th school. In 2024, bodyguard Mykhailo Shchukin took over."

Teachers who remained in the occupied territories continued to work online in Ukrainian schools, and children continued to study. The Russians tried to control this process by organizing door-to-door inspections, threatening parents with fines and even deprivation of parental rights. Some of the children tried to study in Russian and Ukrainian schools in parallel, but it was difficult to combine it. At the same time, the Russians completely transformed the school system into a Russian model, and in 2025, they officially banned the teaching of the Ukrainian language and the history of Ukraine.

There is a shortage of qualified teachers in the occupied territories. The Russians are partially trying to compensate for this with graduates of pedagogical colleges. But they had the highest hopes for the Zemsky Uchitel program. It offers Russian teachers to come to work in the occupied territories. They are provided with housing, a salary with bonuses-about 80,000-100,000 rubles-and a one-time payment: in 2023 it was one million rubles, now it is two million. Despite this, there are few people willing to leave Russia for the occupied territories, our interlocutors say. This affects the process: not all schools are open, and teachers often teach several subjects.

Students study exclusively from Russian textbooks, and in the history of their native land they are told about the "historical connection" of the occupied territories with Russia. Schools have "cadet classes" where children additionally study the basics of military service, wear Russian cadet uniforms and have a military supervisor, and the already mentioned "Unarmy". The Russian "Ministry of Education" has also published lists of "patriotic books and songs" for schoolchildren. These are modern propaganda novels about the "SVO" and songs "My Russia" by Shaman, "Officers" by Oleg Gazmanov and "Russia" by Denis Maidanov.

Media

The story of how Svetlana Zalizetska got out of Melitopol is more like an action movie than reality.

Her media outlet, RIA Melitopol, was launched in 2013 and quickly became popular. Zalizetska recalls that the day before the full-scale war, the site was actively hacked, so journalists moved to Telegram. Svitlana walked around the city, filming rallies and Russian soldiers. To publish the materials, she looked for the highest point where the Internet would catch.

On March twelfth, Svitlana was summoned to her home by the self-proclaimed head of Melitopol, Halyna Danylchenko, for a "conversation." The conversation took place at the half-abandoned Balytsky factory. Danylchenko persuaded Svitlana to cooperate with the occupation authorities. She refused. They let her go, promising that the next conversation would be with the "city commandant." Svitlana realized that she had to leave immediately. She found herself another passport and went to Zaporizhzhia under the guise of an emergency doctor. The next day in Melitopol, the occupiers kidnapped Svitlana's elderly father. They forced him to return, then demanded access to his website and social media pages. Eventually, Svitlana publicly announced that she no longer had anything to do with the site, and her father was released.

After moving to Zaporizhzhia, the RIA Melitopol team rebranded the site to RIA Pivden and reported on the situation in the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. In August 2023, the Russians in Melitopol captured two administrators of the RIA Pivden telegram channel, Anastasia Glukhovska and Georgiy Levchenko. They are still in captivity, and the occupiers have taken away access to the website's channel – it is again called RIA Melitopol and publishes propaganda news.

On the very first day of the occupation, Balytskyi handed over his MTV-plus channel to the Russians. The occupiers turned off the broadcast of Ukrainian channels and replaced them with Russian ones. At the same time, in March, the Melitopolskie Vedomosti holding company ceased operations. Its owner, Mykhailo Kumok, reported this after the Russians grabbed him and took him away for a "preventive conversation." In the first months of the occupation, the media field in Melitopol was completely cleared. And in June 2022, the Russians began building a separate media network in the occupied territories. This was the responsibility of Alexander Malkevich, a media manager from St. Petersburg who was in charge of Yevhen Prigozhin's holding.

Initially, the new ZaTV channel was launched on the basis of MTV-plus. Later, it became part of the ZaMedia holding, which also includes Za!FM radio, the Zaporizhzhia Vestnik/Golos Novorossii newspaper and several websites. The holding is overseen by Malkevich, who has appointed his own people to key positions: the formal head is Vadim Kucher, a deputy and journalist from St. Petersburg, and the director is Vadim Ivanov, with whom Malkevich previously worked. The editors and journalists are also Russians, the content is typical of Russian regional media: the TV channel shows local news about the successes of the occupation authorities and interviews with propagandists, and the radio broadcasts only Russian music, mostly by "patriotic artists" such as Lyube or Oleg Gazmanov.

Part three. Life

For almost four years of occupation, those who stayed there had to change their lives significantly.

First of all, get a Russian passport. Already in 2023, it was impossible to receive any services without it. In February of the following year, Balytsky said that those who did not support Russia would be deport from the occupied territories and that this process has already begun: "We evicted whole families".

"I am aware of such cases," confirms Svitlana Zalizetska, "Most often, those who do not have a Russian passport are deported. They can be stopped for inspection in the city and arrested for lack of documents. Then such people are taken to Verkhnyi Lars (a checkpoint on the border between Russia and Georgia – LIGA.net) and left there – they have to get out on their own."

But even having a Russian passport does not guarantee access to all services, simply because they often do not exist.

For example, there is a critical shortage of doctors in the occupied territories.

"These are both primary care doctors-family therapists, pediatricians-and narrow specialists," Olena from Berdiansk (name changed for security reasons) tells LIGA.net. "To make an appointment, for example, with an ophthalmologist, you have to go to a private clinic, because it's simply impossible to do so in a polyclinic. But even in a private clinic, you have to wait a month and a half. The Russians boast that they have brought modern equipment to hospitals, but what's the point if there is no one to work with it?"

The Zemsky Doctor incentive program, which works in the same way as the Zemsky Teacher program, still does not attract as many people as it should. Doctors come for a maximum of a few months, and often just for a few days. Such "business trips" are also reported on propaganda websites. The visiting teams work for several weeks in villages where there are often no doctors at all, and then return to Russia.

Russia has also failed to solve the issue of water in the occupied territories – it simply does not exist. Before the full-scale war, the main source of water for the south of Zaporizhzhia region was the Kakhovka reservoir. Since 2023, when the Russians blew up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station, this source has been gone. Melitopol now takes water from local wells, but this water is brackish and has impurities. In Berdiansk, they use the Berdiansk Reservoir, which is gradually becoming shallow and cannot provide water even for the remaining number of residents. "This water is shitty, but even it is not available," Olena adds.

Finally, the residents have to put up with a large number of Russians who behave like the ruling class and from whom the locals do not expect anything good.

Russians are everywhere. The Russian military is based in the cities. They are treated in civilian hospitals, which is why locals cannot get there, and they are stopped on the streets and have their phones checked. Russians come to work, and their salaries are significantly higher than those of locals. Often these are people from poor regions of Russia who work on a shift basis at construction sites. Russians come to visit their relatives, occupy apartments that are taken away from those who have left for the government-controlled territory.

"Melitopol residents say that there are no our people in the city. Only outsiders," says Zalizetska.

***

For almost four years of occupation, Russia has not been able to make the local population loyal. Olena from Berdiansk says that most people are just trying to adapt to the new conditions. There are fewer and fewer people who support Ukraine. They, in turn, are being cautious – looking for jobs that will not be considered collaboration, not using social media, and not communicating with their neighbors.

Danylo says that he wanted to stay in Melitopol before the full-scale war broke out. He studied in another Ukrainian city, but after graduating from college, he returned home. Now he doesn't think he'll go back to Melitopol if Ukrainian troops liberate it. Over the years, the city has probably changed so much that he doesn't want to see these changes.

Svitlana Zalizetska finds hope in conversations with Melitopol residents. It is becoming increasingly difficult to talk to them because they are afraid of reprisals. But those with whom she manages to get in touch complain a lot about the Russians. Zalizetska says there is irritation in the city, which translates into clashes with the military, small and domestic, but it is these clashes that Zalizetska is sure best show how tired people are of the occupation.

"The people I talk to cannot go out and talk to someone 'heart to heart,'" Svitlana adds, "because they don't know if they will be denounced Life under occupation is on pause. Everyone has created their own little world and is sitting in it. And waiting for liberation."

The text was created with the support of the European journalistic network n-ost.