They learn why the thesis about the enemy's "meat assaults" is wrong

I look at some of the assessments of the Russian command's actions by a large number of our so-called information workers (I won't even call them journalists or experts) and I am a little "shocked" (surprised) by their content related to this war.

If you listen to them, watch them and read them, you may get the impression that the Russian command are bloodthirsty, stupid and clumsy monsters who are constantly driving their own personnel to slaughter and do not know any other techniques and methods of organizing and conducting combat operations.

This may be appropriate from the information and psychological point of view, but from the point of view of a balanced, rational assessment and analysis of the enemy's actions, it is absolutely not. This is disheartening and contributes to the creation of a distorted view of the enemy's real capabilities and capacities.

For some reason, we have decided that the Russian command does not learn anything and does not take into account the experience (including its own) of war when planning and organizing combat operations at the tactical and operational levels.

The imaginary "scheme" that such domestic experts and "informers" draw us is simple: the Russians allegedly drive a bunch of personnel to the chosen direction, create a multiple advantage, and then try to break through the defense system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with "meat assaults".

Everything seems to be clear, understandable (especially to an ordinary Ukrainian citizen) and fits into the canons that, according to our "experts," are accepted in the "Soviet-Russian GS".

In reality, the situation is much more complicated and, to put it mildly, different: Russians are learning, and at all three main levels of government – tactical, operational and strategic.

For example.

Everyone remembers the assaults by Russian troops on Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Toretsk and Chasovyi Yar. How they were organized by the Russian command, how they happened in reality, and what they cost them.

But compare this with what is happening now in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk. Compare the methods and techniques used by the Russian command at the tactical level now with those it used before.

Remember that these methods of "infiltration" and "covert penetration" instead of head-on attacks and assaults on urban areas, Russian troops had to be trained (and on a massive scale), and that they had to organize interaction and sustainable command and control of troops (at least at the tactical level) and do much more to ensure that this would have the desired effect (and, judging by the current situation, it does).

Therefore, dear colleagues, do not underestimate the enemy.

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